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I. INTRODUCTION
Children pose a puzzle for American constitutional juris-
prudence. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that children are persons within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment and has accorded them some, but
not all, of the individual rights enjoyed by adults.' On the
other hand, the Court has largely reinforced the notion that
the traditional family unit provides adequate constitutional
protection for children. Particularly in the substantive due
process context, the Court has tended to equate children's
interests with those of their parents and to protect children
derivatively through such doctrines as parental autonomy
and familial privacy.2
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See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)
("Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitu-
tional rights."); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (protecting a student's right to engage in silent and passive protest on school
property); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that juvenile adjudication proceed-
ings, where a commitment to a State institution Is a possibility, must meet "due pro-
cess" standards). Even these cases have generally failed to articulate any coherent
theory of children's due process rights, particularly where children's Interests con-
flict with the interests of their caretakers. See Catherine J. Ross, An Emerging Right
for Mature Minors to Receive Information, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 172-82 (1999).
2 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (allowing Amish parents to
withdraw children from school after eighth grade); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (protecting, in dicta, parents' rights to educate their chil-
dren); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (reversing conviction of teacher
who had instructed child in foreign language in violation of Nebraska statute, under
reasoning that Fourteenth Amendment protects teacher's liberty); see also Catherine
J. Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing Counsel for Children in Civil LItiga-
tion, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1571, 1586 (1996) (critiquing cases).
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Reliance on parental liberty and privacy rights to protect
children has always been problematic. As Professor Barbara
Woodhouse argues in her "revisionist" account of Meyer and
Pierce, locating a parental right to raise children in the liberty
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only makes sense if
children are viewed as the property of their parents. Moreo-
ver, the Court's insistence on protecting children derivatively
through such doctrines as parental privacy ignores the inter-
ests of those children whose parents lack the economic
means to provide protection, while prevailing notions of con-
stitutional entitlements do little to guarantee parents such
means. Perhaps more troubling, by limiting the State's
authority to intervene in family life, conceptions of parental
privacy and autonomy endanger children whose parents lack
the will to protect them.'
Despite these shortcomings, the idea that society can best
promote children's interests by reinforcing parental authority
and preventing undue State interference with parental child-
rearing decisions retains power as a jurisprudential construct
and as a check against state-imposed orthodoxy.5 This belief,
however, must be separated from its development during a
time when marriage and parenthood were closely tied, intra-
family conflict was suppressed, and an elaborate network of
legal and social incentives and sanctions forced (most) adult
women to devote the bulk of their time and energy to caring
for children. Today, these background legal and societal as-
sumptions no longer hold true.6 The law now recognizes that
parenting takes place in a broad variety of familial settings.
More importantly, the law now views adult family members as
3 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse. "lWho Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce
and the Child as Property. 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995. 1041-42 (1992).
4 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs.. 489 U.S. 189. 203
(1989) (holding that state officials did not breach a constitutional duty when they
knowingly failed to protect a four-year old boy from a brutal beating at the hands of
his biological father, and noting that, had state authorities moved too quickly to in-
tervene "they would likely have been met with charges of Improperly intruding into
the parent-child relationship, charges based on the same Due Process Clause that
forms the basis for the present charge of failure to provide adequate protection').
This is not to suggest that the State has not historically intervened in children's
lives, particularly the lives of poor children, but DeSlaney reaffirms that the State Is
under no constitutional obligation to do so.
5 For one argument as to its continued validity, see Martha Albertson Fineman.
What Placefor Family Privacy? 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 1999): Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, The Dark Side of Family Privacy. 67 GEO. VASH. L RE%. _
(forthcoming 1999); see also Ira C. Lupu. The Separation of Powers and the Protection
of Children, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317 (1994).
6 For an argument that these background assumptions have simply changed
forms, see Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms
ofStatus-Enforcing StateAction, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997).
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autonomous individuals whose separate preferences and de-
cisions demand social respect and legal protection. Parents
are no longer partners for life, if, indeed, they become part-
ners at all. Women are no longer forced to choose mother-
hood as their only, or, indeed, their primary, career. 8 Yet
neither fathers nor society has responded to women's chang-
ing investment in parenting by significantly increasing their
role in caring for children. As Janet Dolgin recently observed,
"Children- and, even more, childhood- continue to be un-
derstood in traditional terms, but the legal and familial
structures within which those terms once made sense have
largely disappeared.
The demise of these traditional legal and familial struc-
tures has led some child advocates to seek enhanced consti-
tutional rights on behalf of children. But constitutional
rights, as conventionally understood, are ill-suited to address
the needs of children because they fail to address the reality
of children's lives, particularly their dependence on adult
caretakers. Children require ongoing, intimate, hierarchical
relationships. Legal doctrines and processes must both fa-
cilitate the formation and maintenance of these dependency
relationships, and protect children from the vulnerability cre-
ated when those relationships go awry. The conventional
means for providing these protections is the use of "rights."
For groups that have been historically subordinated, rights
discourse can be powerful, indicating that they, too, are de-
serving of recognition under our Constitution. Yet rights
discourse remains an imperfect method for describing the re-
alities of children's lives and for recognizing and protecting
children's interests."
See JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARENTS TO PARTNERS (forthcoming 1999).
8 Indeed, most women are arguably economically precluded from choosing to
work exclusively in the home. See generally ELLEN GALINSKY, ASK THE CHILDREN:
WHAT AMERICA'S CHILDREN REALLY THINK ABOUT WORKING PARENTS (1999) (exploring
children's and parents' views of working families).
9 Janet Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of Children and the Parent-
Child Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REv. 345, 348 (1997).
10 For a discussion of the importance of rights, see, e.g., Richard Delgado, The
Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?. 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 306-07 (1987); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Criti-
cal Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 357 (1987);
Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed
Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 432-33 (1987).
1See generally Martha Minow, Rights for The Next Generation: A Feminist Ap-
proach to Children's Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 1 (1986) (arguing that other social
goals such as crime reduction and abortion regulation, rather than the well-being of
children, are the dominant objectives of child welfare laws); Barbara Bennett Wood-
house, Children's Rights: The Destruction and Promise of Family, 1993 BYU L. REv.
497 (1993) (advocating a new approach based on a community ethos that values
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The continuing controversy over the confidentiality of
adoption records illustrates the inadequacy of existing con-
stitutional law doctrine to address issues involving children
and their families. The typical adoption concerns a child and
the new family unit that is created to substitute for the
child's biological family.1 2 One aspect of this legal substitu-
tion has been the sealing of the adoptee's original birth cer-
tificate. As they mature, adoptees often seek information
about their biological families, including their original birth
certificates. Constitutional law has proved to be an awkward
vehicle for articulating and evaluating the claims of adoptees
to information about their biological families. Courts have
unsuccessfully attempted to balance the rights of adoptees
against those of their biological and adoptive parents, rather
than recognizing and attempting to mediate the overlapping
identity issues at stake.
This article first reviews the history of closed adoption rec-
ords in the United States, focusing on the post-World War II
shift from confidentiality to secrecy. Next, it discusses the
constitutional law challenges brought initially by adult adop-
tees to the sealing of records and, more recently, the chal-
lenges of birth parents to efforts to open records. The article
then turns to arguments in favor of, and against, open rec-
ords and concludes that these arguments point strongly in
the direction of openness, particularly for prospective adop-
tions. We thus propose a presumption of open records, at the
election of an adult adoptee, to replace the current secrecy
requirement. We question the assumption that life-long se-
crecy serves the interests of biological parents, adoptive par-
ents, and adoptees. While we would preserve the biological
parents' option to preclude contact, we believe that this oppo-
sition should not prevent the adoptee from accessing the
original birth certificate. Our proposal would apply only to
adult adoptees, in recognition of the evolving nature of chil-
dren's and parents' identity interests. This approach recog-
nizes the integrity of the adoptive family while the adoptee is
young, but then privileges an adoptee's choice to seek addi-
children as individual members of society and not just as an extension of their par-
ents). As Catherine Ross points out, the usefulness of rights may also depend on the
child's age. See Ross, supra note 1. at 178-20 1.
12 Although we focus in this article on infant adoptions by adults unrelated to the
child, these are actually a minority of the adoptions finalized in the United States.
Professor Joan Hollinger notes that at least 60% of all adoptions are by relatives.
See Joan Heifetz Hollinger. Introduction to I ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.05121 1-
53 (Joan Heifetz Hollinger et al. eds.. 1998). Adoption of adults remains relatively
infrequent, but does serve as a means of allowing otherwise unrelated individuals to
serve as "family."
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tional familial ties when she is mature; it also protects the
rights of biological parents by allowing them to establish a
relationship with the adoptee, but respecting their choice to
veto contact.
II. ADOPTEES AND OPEN RECORDS
Adoption is a state-sanctioned process in which the rights
of a biological parent are terminated and the child becomes
part of a new legally recognized family. The biological parents
subsequently have no legally recognized relationship with the
child, as the adoptive parents assume all of the rights and
obligations attached to parenthood. The child is not a party
to any of these arrangements, although, obviously, she is the
subject of the situation. Since World War II, adoption in the
United States has been marked by secrecy and closed pro-
ceedings. 3 Under the typical scenario, parents who relin-
quished a child for adoption received no identifying informa-
tion about the child's placement, nor did the child receive
identifying information about her biological parents.1 4 Thus,
neither adoptive parents nor adoptee children have had the
means to contact a biological parent; nor did a biological par-
ent have the means to contact anyone within the adoptive
family. All records, including the adoptee's original birth cer-
tificate, were sealed by statute and could not be opened, ex-
cept upon a judicial finding of "good cause." The state even
issued a new birth certificate identifying the adoptive parents
as the child's only parents. 15
This secret, closed system is a relatively recent phenome-
non. The first "modem" adoption statutes were enacted
around the middle part of the nineteenth century. These
statutes were "modem" in that they focused on protecting the
welfare of the child, rather than merely providing heirs for the
adoptive parents. 6 These statutes were not, however, con-
13 See Joan Heifetz HoUinger, Aftermath of Adoption: Legal and Social Conse-
quences, in 2 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 13.0111] (Joan Helfetz Hollinger et al.
eds., 1998).
14 This description applies to non-relative adoptions, which account for approxi-
mately 40-50% of all domestic adoptions. See E. WAYNE CARP. FAMILY MATrERS:
SECRECY AND DISCLOSuRE IN THE HISTORY OF ADOPTION 1 (1998). Adoptions of older
children, who have spent time in foster care, often do not conform to this model.
15 See Hollinger, supranote 13, at § 13.01[11], 13-6.
6 See Leo Albert Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L.
REV. 743, 748-49 (1956) (arguing that the "true genesis" of American adoption law
beginning about 1849 was concern for the welfare of neglected and dependent chil-
dren): Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modem American Family Law: Child
Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 1038, 1042-1043
(1979) (analyzing an 1851 Massachusetts adoption statute as the first "modem"
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cerned with secrecy or confidentiality.'7 Adoption evolved over
the next century, becoming more bureaucratic and profes-
sionalized.'8 The first state law that required a home investi-
gation to determine the appropriateness of an adoptive
household was enacted in Minnesota in 1917. This law also
restricted access to adoption court files to the "parties in in-
terest and their attorneys and representatives of the State
board of control."' 9 The purpose of these early confidentiality
restrictions was not to prevent those involved in the adoption
from having access to information, but to keep the public
from viewing these files to determine whether a child was
born outside of marriage.' Thus, these Progressive Era stat-
utes made court fies confidential, but not secret, as they did
not prevent members of the adoption triad from obtaining
information and viewing their adoption records. Reviewing
the trend in 1941, a U.S. Children's Bureau researcher ex-
plained, "with the growing appreciation of the need for pro-
tecting adoption records from curious eyes, an increasing
number of adoption laws have included provisions to keep the
records confidential and available only to persons having le-
gitimate reasons for knowing their contents."2 '
Similarly, during the 1930s and 1940s, when states began
issuing new birth certificates to adopted children, the states'
goals were to improve the collection of children's vital statis-
tics and reduce the stigma of illegitimacy, not to prevent
adopted children from gaining access to their original birth
certificates. "Vital statisticians shared the basic assumptions
of Progressive child welfare reformers that the birth record
would be sealed to preserve family information for those con-
nected to the adoption, not to prevent them from viewing
such data."2 Moreover, until the end of World War ll. social
workers involved in adoption compiled detailed family histo-
ries of the children they placed, under the assumption that
adoption statute); Janet Hopkins Dickson. Comment The Emerging Rights of Adop-
tive Parents: Sustenance or Specter?. 38 UCLA L. REV. 917. 924 (1991) (noting that
the 1851 Massachusetts adoption statute made the welfare of the child and the pa-
rental qualifications of the prospective parents Its primary concern).
17 See Hollinger, supranote 13, at § 13.0111). 13-5.
18 For various historical perspectives on adoption, see MATrHEW A. CRESSON.
BUILDING THE INVISIBLE ORPHANAGE (1998): Catherine J. Ross. Families Without Para-
digms: A Historical Perspective on the Varied Experiences of Out-of-Home Placement.
60 OHIO ST. L.J. _ (forthcoming 1999).
19 CARP, supra note 14, at 40 (quoting Children's Code of Minnesota. ch. 222.
1917 MINN. LAVS 335).
20 See id. at 42.
21 Id. at 41-42 (quoting MARY RUTH COLBY, U.S. CHILDREN*S BUREAU. PROBLEIS AXD
PROCEDURES IN ADOPTION (1941)).
2 Id. at 54.
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the children would eventually return to the agencies to re-
quest information about their birth families and that adult
adoptees were entitled to such information.' Thus, through
the first half of the twentieth century, "there existed among
legislators, vital statisticians, and social workers a consensus
both in policy and practice of openness in disclosing infor-
mation to those most intimately connected to adoption."
24
A number of social and professional pressures fueled the
shift from confidentiality to secrecy during the post-World
War II era. Adoption agencies used the promise of secrecy as
a way to distinguish themselves from less respectable adop-
tion sources.2 Social workers argued that secrecy would help
insure the integrity of the adoptive family by preventing dis-
gruntled biological parents from later attempting to reclaim
their children. In addition, social workers believed that the
secrecy of records would help biological mothers "recover"
from their "indiscretion" and continue with their lives as
though they had never had a child.27
The changing demographic composition of birth parents
also contributed to the rise of secrecy. Prior to World War II,
a majority of the birth mothers who surrendered children for
adoption were either married or divorced, and often relin-
quished children only after struggling to support them finan-
cially. In the postwar era, birth mothers were younger and
predominantly single; the vast majority of their children were
born outside of marriage and were relinquished within days
of their birth.' These changing demographics were accom-
panied by a shift in attitudes toward unwed mothers. Before
World War II, out-of-wedlock pregnancy was often explained
as the product of inherent and immutable biological and
moral deficiencies. Children born under such circumstances
were biologically suspect and women who gave birth outside
of marriage were permanently marked as outcast mothers.9
In the post-World War II era, this biological explanation was
replaced with a psychological paradigm that asserted that il-
legitimacy reflected an emotional rather than a biological dis-
2 See id. at 68-70.
24 Id. at 100.
2 See id. at 112-13.
26 See CARP, supra note 14, at 105; Hollinger, supra note 13, at 13-8.
27 See CARP, supranote 14, at 111, 115-16.
2 See idL at 110; see also RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITrLE SUSIE: SINGLE
PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE ROE V. WADE 13 (1992) (noting that the rate of out-of-
wedlock births increased dramatically during and after World War II). Professor
Solinger also notes that adoption functioned differently for white and black mothers
and children.
29 See SOLINGER, supra note 28, at 8, 15.
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order, and that such a "maladjusted" female could be "reha-
bilitated" and reintegrated into society.' Key to this reha-
bilitation was the immediate relinquishment of the child and
the permanent severing of ties between the biological mother
and the adoptive family:
Through adoption, the unwed mother could put the mistake-
both the baby qua baby and the proof of nonmarital sexual
experience- behind her. Her parents were not stuck with a
ruined daughter and a bastard grandchild for life. And the baby
could be brought up in a normative family, by a couple
prejudged to possess all the attributes and resources necessary
for successful parenthood.3'
Secrecy was thus seen as critical to the successful reha-
bilitation of unwed (white) mothers and to their reentry into
the marriage market, as well as to the child's successful inte-
gration into her adoptive family.2 Secrecy also served the
interests of childless couples, who sought adoption in un-
precedented numbers during an era of celebratory pronatal-
ism, which viewed parenthood as a patriotic necessity and a
prerequisite to marital success.Y Adoption protected these
couples from the shame of infertility and created families for
them that were seemingly indistinguishable from their bio-
logical counterparts. By the mid-1960s, these factors had
combined to transmute traditional confidentiality require-
ments into a regime of sealed records and secrecy which pre-
vented all members of the adoption triad from accessing in-
formation about the connection between adopted children
and their biological families.
A. The Early Claims for Opening Records
Beginning in the 1970s, adoptees sought legal access to
their original birth records. They challenged the continuing
secrecy of their birth certificates and pressured states to dis-
close the certificates, complete with the names of their bio-
logical parents.' Although adoptees articulated four different
30 Id. at 16-17; see also id. at 17 (The postwar recasting of white Illegitimate
mothers offered these girls and women a remarkable trade-off. In exchange for their
babies, they could reenter normative life.").
31 Id. at 155.
32 The secrecy provisions, of course, applied at the birth of the child: there is no
evidence of any consideration given to the longevity of these secrecy restrictions.
Telephone Interview with Joan Hollinger. Professor. University of California. Berkeley
(June 23, 1999).
3 See CARP. supra note 14. at 28-29; see also SOUNGER. supra note 28. at 26.
For commentary on these efforts, see. for example. Leslie Allan. ConfJInring the
Constitutionality of Sealing Adoption Records. 46 BROOK. L. REV. 717 (1980) (dis-
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sets of constitutional claims- privacy rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, informational
access rights under the First Amendment, equal protection
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, and anti-slavery
rights under the Thirteenth Amendment- we will focus here
only on the due process claims. This constitutional issue re-
appears in contemporary litigation about the confidentiality of
birth records, but in an ironic transformation, it is the bio-
logical parents invoking the Fourteenth Amendment privacy
claims to protect the continuing secrecy of birth records
against states' efforts to unseal them.
The due process privacy claims dramatize the conflicting
rights that courts believe are at issue in the open records
cases. In discussing the meaning of the zone of family pri-
vacy, courts pose the issue of what is a family and whose
rights within the family should be protected. In discussing
the adoptees' interests, the courts invoke differing meanings
of privacy-is privacy confidentiality, or is it identity-
formation? Is identity based on individual development, or Is
it relational and contextual? By declining to find confidenti-
ality protections for either the biological parents or for the
adoptees, the courts continue to articulate these conflicting
privacy interests- and definitions of privacy- for members
of the adoption triad. The analysis in these cases reveals the
shortcomings of applying traditional due process doctrine to
claims by and involving children.'
In the most widely cited case brought by adoptees, the
Second Circuit rejected the adoptees' claim that their "per-
sonhood" entitled them to open birth records.3" The plaintiff
cussing legal efforts of adult adoptees challenging the sealing of adoption records):
Anne E. Crane, Unsealing Adoption Records: The Right to Know Versus The Right to
Privacy, 1986 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 645 (discussing legislative and judicial challenges to
sealed records); Debra D. Poulin, The Open Adoption Records Movement: Constitu-
tional Cases and Legislative Compromise, 26 J. FAM. L. 395 (1988) (discussing legal
and legislative challenges to the sealing of adoption records); Carol Gloor, Comment,
Breaking the Seal Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Adult Adoptees' Right
to Identity, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 316, 339-40 (1980) (arguing that a due process privacy
claim presents the best option for opening records).
35 This paper focuses primarily on issues involving adopted children. Although
many of the claims concern adult adoptees, the claims derive from what happened to
them as children. We are not, of course, suggesting that adoptees never grow up,
but are instead making the simple point that one's status as an adoptee begins In
childhood.
36 Alma Soc'y Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979). "Personhood" Is de-
fimed as "those attributes of an individual which are irreducible in his selfhood." J.
Braxton Craven, Jr., Personhood: The Right to Be Left Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699,
702 n. 15 (quoting Professor Freund). Professor Jed Rubenfeld notes that person-
hood is difficult to define, but that, at the least, it means that there are some aspects
that are so fundamental to our Identity that the State cannot infringe them. See Jed
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adoptees argued that the New York statutes providing for
sealed adoption records violated the Due Process Clause be-
cause the adoptees were constitutionally entitled to the in-
formation contained in the records.' Adoptees argued that
the Constitution protected their access to information that
was integral to their self-development.9 The Alma Society
court began by observing that the adoptees' claims did not
conform to any existing articulation of the right to privacy
and thus could be rejected solely on that basis.' Nonethe-
less, the court proceeded to analyze the adoptees' claims.
The court noted that the adoptees' requests implicated the
interests of two "families," the biological family and the adop-
tive family.' Drawing on Supreme Court cases addressing
the importance of an intact family, notwithstanding the
claims of a biological father, the Second Circuit recognized
significant interests of the adoptive families which might be
"adversely affected" through disclosure of the names of the
biological parents:
41
[Elven though appellants are adults we must assume that they
are still part of their adoptive families, families still in existence
as to each of them which might be adversely affected by the re-
lease of information as to the names of natural parents or the
unsealing of the adoption records. At least it would seem that
there is an interest on the part of the adopting parents that is of
recognized importance ....
The court, however, did not explain how disclosure would ad-
versely effect adoptive families.
Turning to the interests of the biological parents, the Sec-
ond Circuit used the fundamental right to marry as an argu-
ment that courts must look at "the nature of the relationships
and that choices made by those other than the adopted child
Rubenfeld, he Rght ofPrivacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 753 (1989).
The plaintiffs also claimed violations of the Equal Protection Clause for treating
adopted children differently from other children, who had easy access to their origi-
nal birth certificates, as well as several other claims. See generally Allan. supra note
34, at 723-24 (discussing constitutional challenges to the sealing of adoption rec-
ords).
8 See id. at 723 n.29.
3 See AlmaSoc'y. 601 F.2d. at 1231.
40Id.
41 Id. at 1231-32. The court relied on QuilUoQn v. Walcott. 434 U.S. 246 (1978). to
support its contention that the state has a strong interest in preserving the integrity
of the family unit. Subsequent Supreme Court cases support this interpretation of
Quilloin. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110. 123 (1989) (noting the
"historic respect... traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within
the unitary family"); Janet L. Dolgin. Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Par-
enthood, 40 UCLA L. REv. 637. 655-72 (1993) (discussing Judicial decisions regard-
ing the meaning of family).
42 AlmaSoc'y, 601 F.2d at 1232.
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are involved." 3 Thus, the biological mother's choice to keep
the adoption confidential is a significant consideration be-
cause it presumably influenced her decision to place her child
for adoption.' The court acknowledged that some birth and
adoptive parents might not object to release of the informa-
tion, but suggested that the state legislature had balanced
the different relationships in allowing a hearing to show "good
cause" as to why the records should be unsealed.4 5
The court observed that "appellants' novel claims do not fit
into any as yet recognized category of 'privacy.""' Nonethe-
less, the court proceeded to analyze the claims under existing
due process precedents. The approach, however, is highly
problematic because it attempts to apply constitutional indi-
vidual rights analysis to an issue that is fundamentally about
relationships among families and between family members.
The court thus reasons by analogy to other interests pro-
tected as a form of liberty- first to a case concerning the
rights of a biological father to prevent the adoption of his mi-
nor child, and second, to a case concerning the right to
marry; these cases establish the court's framework for pro-
tecting an intact family.
Although there is no Supreme Court doctrine that
squarely addresses the interrelated aspects of privacy and
adoption, the analogies are inadequate because they deal
with different sets of rights and relationships. The unwed
father case concerns notions of family integrity for an existing
unit against claims of related outsiders; in the case of
adopted children, members of an "intact" family unit seek in-
formation about biologically-related family members." The
child is trying to pierce the privacy that surrounds the adop-
tive family unit in order to get information about what Is, ar-
guably, another family. Thus, it is a claim by someone from
inside the family unit. The marriage cases are perhaps more
similar to the adoption records cases: both concern issues
created by a state-conferred status and both concern the
43 Id. at 1233. The court relied on Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); other
courts analogized the familial situation to that protected in Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967). In a recent decision concerning the due process rights of foster care
parents when the biological parent-child relationship had been terminated, the court
reiterated the protection accorded to freedom of choice in family life. See Rodriguez
v. McLoughlin, 96 Civ. 1986, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
15. 1998) vacated in part on other grounds, 49 F. Supp. 2d 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
44 See Alma Soc'y, 601 F.2d at 1231-32.
45 Id. at 1236.
46 Id. at 1231.
47 The cases are, of course, similar, in that they address Issues of relationships
between family members.
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rights of individuals to choose a particular family form. But
unlike cases involving access to marriage, the adoptees'
claims of access to birth records may affect previous familial
choices made by adoptive and biological parents. Perhaps
this is why the Alma Society opinion analyzed the marriage
cases as requiring the court to "look to the nature of the rela-
tionships and that choices made by those other than the
adopted child are involved,"48 a proposition which ZablocKi, a
right to marry case, does not really support.
Additionally, the Atma Society court was forced to erect
monolithic interests, those of the "adoptive family," the "bio-
logical family," and the adoptee4 9 Even though the court ac-
knowledged that not all members of each group would agree,
it nonetheless yielded to the State's choices in deciding how
best to protect those groups. The court balanced the rights of
adoption triad members, but did not fully articulate anyone's
privacy interests. Instead, the court viewed that States as the
dominant actor. The court appeared to be applying a rational
relationship test, complete with a high degree of deference to
the states.
Although Alma Society is the best known case from this
era, adoptees have repeatedly and unsuccessfully asserted
their constitutional rights to information5 In addition, many
adoptees have attempted either to satisfy the "good cause"
standard in state statutes for disclosure of identifying infor-
mation, or they have attempted to expand the meaning of
"good cause" to become more inclusive."1 These cases often
AlmaSoc'y, 601 F.2d at 1233.
49 This is echoed in the literature about these cases. As one note explains. "A
comparison of... interests indicates the conclusion that interests other than the
adoptee's (i.e. birth parent privacy) are compelling and possibly more deserving of
constitutional protection." Poulin, supra note 34. at 401.
50 For example, several courts have explicitly held that background Information is
not protected by the zone of privacy and thus applied a rational relationship test to
uphold the state adoption statute. See, e.g.. In re Roger B.. 418 N.E.2d 751 (InI.
1981); MIlls v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646. 651 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1977). Courts have also rejected First Amendment claims that adoptees
have a fundamental right of access to such important personal Information. See.
e.g., Mills, 372 A.2d at 652 (finding that adoptees' interests outweighed by interests
of both sets of parents in maintaining confidentiality): Carolyn Burke. Note. The
Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know His Origins. 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1196.
1204-07 (1975) (arguing that adult adoptees should be granted access to their birth
records under the First Amendment); see also Gloor. supra note 34. at 330-32 (ds-
cussing First Amendment arguments).
51 For a discussion of these cases, see. e.g.. Gloor. supra note 34. at 340-42.
Courts have generally defined good cause restrictively to require documented medi-
cal or psychiatric need and have generally rejected claims based simply on emotional
difficulties or a desire to know one's biological origins. See Kathryn J. Giddings.
Note, The Current Status of the Right of Adult Adoptees to Know the Identity of Their
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have a much less developed understanding of the constitu-
tional claims and focus primarily on the narrow meaning of
the good cause standard for disclosure. 2
B. Approaches to Opening Records
Following their failure in the courts, adoptees turned their
efforts toward enacting legislation that would provide them
with access to information about their birth families.' These
legislative efforts have met with some success. Most states
now allow for the release of non-identifying information to
adoptees and adoptive parents.54 In addition, over the past
twenty years, states have established a variety of procedures
designed to allow for contact between adoptees and their
biological relatives when both parties agree to meet. These
procedures typically take one of two forms: mutual consent
registries and confidential intermediary systems. In general,
however, these efforts fall short of the openness desired by
many adult adoptees because the methods are flawed and
underutilized. Only a few states have moved toward com-
pletely open records.
1. Mutual Consent Registries
At least twenty-one states have enacted some form of
mutual consent registry, which allows persons directly in-
Natural Parents, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 677, 699 (1980).
52 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby S., 705 A.2d 822, 826 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Dlv.
1997) (finding that biological mother who sought access to records failed to meet the
good cause standard for disclosure); Backes v. Catholic Fam. & Community Servs.,
509 A-2d 283, 291-94 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985) (denying adult adoptee's good
cause argument to open sealed birth records based on state statutory grounds); In re
Christine, 397 A.2d 511 (R.I. 1979). In an interesting response to the good cause
requirement, the New Jersey courts shifted the burden of proof to the State to show
that good cause did not exist to release records to adult adoptees. See Mills, 372
A.2d at 654 (finding that when adult adoptees request access to their birth records
the burden to show good cause is on the State).
53 See CARP, supra note 14 (discussing adoptees' failures in New York courts and
the proposed Model States Adoption Act and Model State Adoption Procedures);
Wendy Weiss, Note, Ohio House Bill 419: Increased Openness in Adoption Records
Law, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 101, 107 (1997) ("[A]t least thirty-five states have passed
laws granting automatic access to non-ldentifying information and establishing reg-
istry systems for the release of identifying information.").
The Uniform Adoption Act provides for the release of non-identifying medical
and other relevant information to the adoptive parents prior to the adoption. See
UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-106. 9 U.L.A. 17 (Supp. 1999). Adult adoptees can also re-
quest this information from the court or agency that handled the adoption. See Id.
at § 6-103, 9 U.L.A. 83 (Supp. 1999). This information, however, is available only as
of the time of the adoption and is not updated.
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volved in an adoption to register their willingness to meet and
exchange information.-4 Mutual consent registries are pas-
sive: unless a biological relative and an adult adoptee have
each filed a formal consent to release identifying information,
no information will be released. In some states, both biologi-
cal parents must have filed consents before the release of
identifying information.55 In other states, only one parent
need consent.' Additionally, registries often limit applicants
to those whose adoptions occurred within the state.
Even after one party has filed a consent to information
disclosure, the state agency will not seek out other parties
who have not registered to ask if they are willing to have their
identities released. Indeed, the statutes prevent state em-
ployees associated with the registry from releasing any confi-
dential information without the consent of the other party,
much less from assisting an adoptee or a biological parent in
actively searching for each other. Because of the passive
nature of mutual consent registries, adoptees and biological
relatives may not know of the existence of the registry nor
know that they can consent to the disclosure of identifying
information.-s Mutual consent registries operate at the indi-
vidual state level, rather than interstate, although Congress
has repeatedly considered the creation of a national mutual
consent registry that would allow all adoptees and their bio-
logical relatives to register in one place.'
55 See Hollinger, supra note 13. at 13-35: Alan W. Strasser. Adoption Search and
Registry Laws of Vermont and New York: Whose Best Interest Is Being Served. 28
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 669, 670 (1994) (criticizing the passivity of the Vermont registry
system). The Uniform Adoption Act authorizes a state mutual consent registry. See
UNF. ADOPION Acr, §§ 6-104 to 6-107, 9 U.L.A. 83-86 (Supp. 1999).
56 See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4138-d (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1998) (re-
quiring both parents' consent). See generaUy Hollinger. supra note 13.
57 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210. § 50 (Law. Co-op. 1994): 23 PA. CO:S. STAT.
§ 2905 (1998).
5s While there has been little sustained critique of mutual consent registries in the
law review literature, several articles have discussed some or the flaws. See Jason
Kuhns, The Sealed Adoption Records Controversy: Breaking Down the Walls of Se-
crecy, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 259. 282-83 (1994) (pointing out that the poor
publicity of such registries requires considerable initiative by birth parents): Bobbi
W. Y. Lum, Privacy v. Secrecy: The Adoption Records Movement and its Impact on
Hawai'i, 15 U. HAW. L. REV. 483, 506 (1993) (noting problems with mutual consent
registries, including lack of publicity, inability to afford registration fees, and prob-
lems with counseling requirements); Strasser. supra note 55. at 688 (noting the low
match rate of New York's registry).
59 Senator Carl Levin has advocated the enactment of legislation to establish a
federal mutual consent registry since 1980. The legislation has passed the Senate
several times, but has never passed the House. The House Ways and Means Sub-
committee recently held hearings to consider the registry.
The federal registry would overcome some of the problems of state registries by
establishing a national clearinghouse, thus providing one repository of Information
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While the registries provide a mechanism for biological
parents and adoptees to contact each other, registries have
been relatively unsuccessful in publicizing their existence as
well as in matching registrants. State mutual consent reg-
istries are typically both underfunded and understaffed; for
example, few of them have a presence on the Internet.6' One
recent study reported that finding a "staff member knowl-
edgeable about registry operations in at least half of the 21
states surveyed required 8 to 10 phone calls."62 The restric-
tions on many registries further limit their utility; if an adop-
tee does not know whether she was born and/or adopted in a
particular state, then she may be unable to use that state's
registry.6 Because there is little, if any, interstate communi-
cation, a biological parent who registers in Pennsylvania will
not be contacted if her biological child registers in New Jer-
sey.64 In addition to incurring various fees for using the reg-
istry, the applicant may also be required to undergo coun-
seling.' Furthermore, the registration form may demand
information unavailable to the registrant.
The story of football player Tim Green is typical of some of
the problems associated with registries.r He was born and
adopted in New York. When he decided to search for his bio-
logical parents, one of his first steps was to register with New
York's registry. To do so, however, he needed a waiver from
both of his adoptive parents, and this initially dissuaded him
and eliminating the multiple and often conflicting requirements in state registries. It
would also solve the problem of interstate cooperation. See Mutual Voluntary Adop-
tion Registries: Hearings on S. 1487 Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Naomi R. Cahn,
Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School), available in
1998 WL 12761111 [hereinafter Cahn Statement].
Nonetheless, the national registry is a passive device, and subject to all of the
problems inherent in not letting the interested parties control the process. Even so.
it has met with violent opposition. See The Levin Bill: Federal vs. Private National
Registries in the "Open Records" Policy Debate. NAT'L ADOPTION REP. (Nat'l Council for
Adoptions, Washington, D.C.), Oct./Nov. 1998, at 1 (claiming the bill would Invade
privacy and labeling some of its advocates as "anti-adoption and anti-privacy").
0 Professor Strasser reports that, in its first nine years of existence, the New York
registry reported a total of 4,000 registrants and 36 matches. See Strasser, supra
note 55, at 688.
61 See Melisha Mitchell et al., Mutual Consent Voluntary Registries: An Exercise in
Patience--and Failure, ADOPTIVE FAM. 30, 31-32, Jan./Feb. 1999.
62 Id. at 31.
In Oklahoma, for example, prior to 1997, registration was limited to adoptees
whose adoptions had been arranged by the State Department of Human Services.
See D. Marianne Brower Blair, The New Oklahoma Adoption Code: A Quest to Ac-
commodate Diverse Interests, 33 TULSA L.J. 177, 250-51 (1997).
See Cahn Statement, supra note 59.
65 See Lum, supra note 58, at 506.
66 SeeTIM GREEN, A MAN AND His MOTHER: AN ADOPTED SON'S SEARCH (1997).
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from registering lest he cause them undue pain. Once he de-
cided to do so, he describes his adoptive mother's reaction to
signing the waiver documents:
I knew from her words, from her body language, and from the
quavering tone of her voice the impact this event was having on
her. It was as though I had brought her to the brink of that
same chasm I had dreamed about .... It was as if I were
standing behind her as she teetered, and if I moved that paper
just an inch, it would tilt the balance. She would fall.67
2. Confidential intermediary systems
At least eighteen states have gone a step further than
mutual consent registries and have enacted "search and con-
sent" procedures designed to be more active in facilitating an
exchange of information between adoptive and biological
families. Under these statutes, if an adoptee or biological
parent requests identifying records, then the State has an af-
firmative obligation to search for and to request consent from
the other parties to the adoption for the release of the identi-
fying information.' If consent is obtained, the information is
released. If consent is denied, or if the other party cannot be
found, then the applicant adoptee may still petition the court
to open the records under the traditional good cause stan-
dard. 9 Where both parties consent, intermediaries may also
help arrange meetings of adoptees and birth relatives.
Because they are more active than the mutual consent
registries- instead of waiting for a matching registration, the
State seeks out the other party- the search and consent pro-
cedures may be more helpful in facilitating contact. None-
theless, like the mutual consent registries, the confidential
intermediary process is problematic. As with the registries,
states may provide little publicity about the availability of the
intermediary process. When there is little information about
the location of the biological parent, it becomes the state's re-
sponsibility to search for the parent.70 The diligence and re-
sources of the intermediary thus determine whether the bio-
logical parent is found. Consequently, the intermediary
system is more expensive than the consent registry.7'
67 Id. at 112.
6s See Lure, supra note 57, at 507 (discussing the State's affirmative duty to seek
outparties to the adoption and request consent).
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.89(3)(6) (West Supp. 1998).
See Lum. supra note 58. at 507-08 (noting that an Intermediary's success de-
pends on state law and judicial interpretation).
71 See Rosemary J. Avery, Information. Disclosure and Openness In Adoption: State
Policy and Empirical Evidence. 20 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 57. 61-62 (1998)
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Moreover, as one article points out, "[a] birth parent's re-
fusal to consent effectively ends" the process, preventing the
adoptee from access to any information. 72 At the time of ini-
tial contact by an intermediary, the parent may be completely
unprepared for any contact, and will not be given any support
and counseling concerning her choice to remain unidentified.
Because the intermediary program is designed only for this
initial contact, the adoptee may never know if a non-
consenting parent changes her mind.
In addition, the confidential intermediary programs may
include restrictive conditions that make them difficult to use.
For example, the Oklahoma registry is unavailable to an adult
adoptee who knows of a minor biological sibling, for fear that
the sibling's information will also be disclosed.7 3  Further-
more, an adoptee can only apply after she has been registered
with the state's mutual consent registry for at least six
months.74
The underlying problem with both the mutual consent
registry and the confidential intermediary approach is the
lack of control experienced by the registrants. Even after an
adoptee has taken the step of attempting to make contact,
she must wait for someone else to file with the mutual con-
sent registry or for the confidential intermediary to do her
work well. 5  Moreover, these approaches do nothing to ad-
dress the issues of shame and status identified by many
adoptees' rights organizations. For example, Bastard Nation,
perhaps the most radical of the adoptees' rights organiza-
tions, categorically rejects mutual consent registries as well
as the confidential intermediary system. The name Bastard
Nation results from a:
reclaimling of] the badge of bastardy as placed on us by those
who would attempt to shame us for our parent's marital status
at the time of our births. We see nothing shameful in being
adopted, nor in being born out of wedlock, and thus we see no
reason for adoption to continue to be veiled in secrecy through
use of the sealed record system and the pejorative use of the
(noting that "search and consent" laws requiring intermediaries are often complex
and costly); Letter from Annette Appell, to Naomi Cahn (May 31, 1999) (on file with
the University ofPennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law).
Kuhns, supra note 58, at 283.
74 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7508-1.3(c)(2) (Supp. 1998).
See Blair, supra note 63, at 254 (listing this and other "restrictions upon those
eligible to apply for or be the subject of a search"). For other criticisms of the confi-
dential intermediary system, such as the lack of training of intermediaries, see CARP.
suIra note 14, at 230.
See Mitchell, supra note 61, at 33.
76 See Marley Greiner, et al., Bastard Nation Mission Statement (visited Sept. 1.
1999) <http://www.bastards.org/whoweare/issionl.htm>.
[Vol. 2:1
OPENING CLOSED RECORDS
term 1,astard. '77
3. Open Records
Finally, some states provide for varying degrees of open-
ness in their adoption records. Two states, Alaska and Kan-
sas, allow adult adoptees access to their original birth certifi-
cates upon request, without a judicial or administrative
hearing.' The Alaska statute simply provides that, when an
adoptee who is eighteen or older requests the name of her
biological parent, the State must provide a copy of the origi-
nal birth certificate.m Other states provide that, for adoptions
finalized after the date of a statutory change, an adult adop-
tee may obtain a copy of her original birth certificate, unless
a birth parent has filed a denial of consent or a request for
nondisclosure.80 These states may also require that birth
parents be given the opportunity to fie a nondisclosure form.
In Vermont, for example, the state will disclose information
about the biological parents, unless they have ified a "request
for nondisclosure."8 Similarly, Delaware recently enacted a
77 Id.; see also Katheryn D. Katz. Ghost Mothers: Human Egg Donation and the
Legacy of the Past, 57 ALB. L. REV. 733. 758 (1994) (discussing how the stigma and
shame of illegitimacy have framed the laws of adoption).
78 See ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.500 (MIchie 1998): KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2423 (Supp.
1998). Kansas never enacted legislation sealing records, and Alaska unsealed the
records in the 1950s. See Rene Sanchez. Oregon Unseals and Painful Adoption Issue:
Adoptee Access to Birth Records Raises Issues of Digni y. Privacy. WASH. POST. Nov.
26, 1998, at Al.
79 See ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.500(a) (MIchie 1998). The statute also allows the bio-
logical parent to receive the name and address of an adult adoptee if the adoptee has
indicated in writing her consent to disclosure. See Id. at § 18.50.500(d). The Kansas
statute allows for the opening of a sealed birth record 'upon the demand of the
adopted person if of legal age or by an order of courL" KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2423
(Supp. 1998).
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.89(b) (West 1998): WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.345
(1997).
81 VT. STAT. ANN., tiL 15A, § 6-105(b)(2) (Supp. 1998). The statute explicitly pro-
vides that an adoptive parent can withdraw the disclosure veto. See id. at § 6-106.
This procedure applies only to adoptions finalized after July 1. 1986: for adoptions
finalized prior to that date, there must be an affirmative indication from the biologi-
cal parent that she consents to disclosure. See Id. at § 6-105(b)(1)(2). The Vermont
Supreme Court recently issued its first decision under the new open records statute.
See In re Margaret Susan P.. 733 A.2d 38 (VL 1999) (holding that an adoptee is enti-
tled to a photocopy of her adoption records under the Vermont Adoption Act).
The Washington procedure is similar. For adoptions after October 1. 1993. the
state will release the information to an adoptee over the age of eighteen. unless there
is a disclosure veto. See WASH. REV. CODE. § 26.33.345.
In Minnesota. an adoptee who is at least nineteen can request her original birth
certificate. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.89(subd. 1). The state must then attempt to
notify the biological parents of this request and may charge the adoptee for this
service. See id. at (subd. 2). The notification must be through a personal contact In
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statute, effective in January of 1999, that allows adoptees
over the age of twenty-one to receive their original birth cer-
tificates, unless the biological parent has filed a disclosure
veto in the three years prior to the request.82
Two other states, Tennessee and Oregon, have recently
attempted to open records, but their laws have been chal-
lenged in court. On November 3, 1998, Oregon voters passed
a ballot initiative that allows adoptees to receive their original
birth certificates in the same manner as any other person.'
Opponents quickly challenged the measure in court, arguing
that it elevated the rights of adoptees over those of the bio-
logical parents and provided insufficient protection to biologi-
cal parents who wished to preserve the privacy of their adop-
tion decisions.8 4 In December 1998 an Oregon trial court
issued a preliminary injunction blocking the initiative from
becoming law.' Trial is scheduled for late 1999.
C. Challenges to Open Records Statutes
In response to the limited success of the adoption rights
movement in persuading states to unseal original birth rec-
ords, biological parents have begun to assert a due process
which the parent is given information about the adoptee's request and about the
parent's right to consent or to veto disclosure. See id. If the state Is unable to con-
tact the biological parents, and if there is no disclosure veto, then for adoptions fi-
nalized after August 1, 1977, the identilying information is released; for adoptions
finalized earlier, the adoptee must petition the court for the information. See Id. at
(subd. 3).
See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 923 (Supp. 1998).
83 See Talk of the Nation" Adoption and Birth Records (NPR radio broadcast, Nov.
17, 1998) (transcript on file with the University of Pennsylvanla Journal of Constilu-
tional Law). The proposed law provides:
Upon receipt of a written application to the state registrar, any adopted person 21
years of age and older born in the state of Oregon shall be Issued a certified copy of
his or her unaltered original and unamended certificate of birth in the custody of the
state registrar with procedures, filing fees, and waiting periods identical to those Im-
posed upon nonadopted citizens of the state of Oregon.
Oregon Measure No. 58 (visited, Nov. 30, 1999)
<http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov398/guide/ measure/m58.htm>.
This represents a dramatic change from existing law, which sealed the original
records of adoptees and issued new birth certificates with the names of the adoptive
parents. The existing law has only been in place since 1957: prior to that, adoption
records were not sealed. See OR. REV. STAT. § 7.211 (1998).
84 See Lynette Clemetson, Haunted by a Painful History, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22,
1999, at 46 ("A group of birth mothers filed suit against the state, claiming it [the
Oregon law] violated their right to privacy. With adoptees and birth mothers pitted
against each other, the court must now wrestle with the tough question of whose
rights are more important."), see also Oregon Measure No. 58, supra note 83 (offering
ar4 ments against passage of the Oregon statute).
See Jeff Wright, Judge Blocks Adoption Ruling from Becoming Law. THE
REGISTER GUARD, Dec. 3, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16352212.
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claim to maintain confidentiality in the adoption process. In
the most recent federal case considering the confidentiality of
adoption records, the Sixth Circuit considered a challenge to
the 1996 Tennessee statute that allows adult adoptees to ac-
cess their birth records, but requires adoptees to honor a
"contact veto" filed by a biological relative.6 The 1996 legis-
lation reversed the 1951 law that had precluded adoptees
from accessing their birth recordsY The 1996 statute allows
the release of all records relating to an adoption to any adop-
tee over the age of twenty-one, as well as to her biological
relatives, with the adoptee's written consent. Just as adop-
tees had earlier argued that their right to privacy rendered
unconstitutional the sealing of records, biological and adop-
tive parents now argue that the unsealing violates their right
to privacy.
Both biological and adoptive parents challenged the stat-
ute's constitutionality. As amicus curiae, the National Coun-
cil for Adoption asserted that "the adoption decision is one of
'the most intimate and personal choices a person may make
in a lifetime, [one of the] choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy,' and essential to 'the right to define one's own
existence... [and] attributes of personhood.'""3 Biological
parents argued that the legislation violated their privacy
rights because the State had promised them confidentiality at
the time of adoption.9 If a child were to find her biological
parents, they argued, this could be extremely disruptive to
the new life created by the parents.9 Moreover, the biological
Doe v. Sundquist, 106 F.3d 702, 704-05 (6th Cir. 1997). cert. dented. 522 U.S.
810 (1997). The Tennessee legislature amended its adoption law after three years of
study. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-127 (1998). The statute provides that adoption
records will be made available to adopted persons over the age of 21. See Id. at § 37-
1-127(c)(1(A)(i). The birth parents can record their willingness or unwillingness for
contact through a "contact veto registry" which differs from a disclosure veto. Id. at §
36-1-128. The statute also provides that no Identifying information shall be released
without the consent of the biological parent if the records indicate that the biological
parent was the victim of rape or incest. See Dianna L. Schmied. A Road Map
Through Tennessee's New Adoption Statute 27 U. MEM. L. REv. 885. 901-02 (1997):
see also M. Christina Rueff, Note, A Comparison of Tennessee's Open Records Law
with Relevant Laws in Other English-Speaking Countries. 37 BRANDEIS L. J. 453
(1998-99) (discussing the statutorily recognized right to access adoption Information
in England, Scotland, New Zealand, and New South Wales, though Canada. Ireland.
and the United States deny access to this information).
87 SeeTENN. CODEANN. § 36-1-127(a)(1)-(2) (1998).
Brief of Amicus Curiae National Council for Adoption for Appellants at 7. Doe v.
Sundquist. 943 F. Supp. 886 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Ca-
sey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). affd 106 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 1997).
See Brief for Appellants at 15. Doe. 106 F.3d at 702 (hereinafter Appellants"
Brief].
9 See id. at 16 (quoting Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics. 148 N.J. Su-
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parents argued that more parents would choose abortion over
adoption if they lost the guarantee of privacy with respect to
their decision to relinquish a child for adoption. Finally, bio-
logical parents asserted that the statute violated individuals'
right to avoid disclosure of confidential information concern-
ing personal issues.9'
The challengers also asserted claims on behalf of adoptive
parents. They argued that the familial rights of adoptive par-
ents would be violated because siblings of adopted children
would obtain information. 92 Moreover, they claimed that the
release of records infringed upon the adoptive parents' repro-
ductive privacy: "[The decision to adopt a child is as much a
reproductive choice as is the decision to conceive through
natural means."
In examining the open records statute, the Sixth Circuit
expressed:
skepticism that information concerning a birth might be pro-
tected from disclosure by the Constitution .... The Tennessee
legislature has resolved a conflict between... [the public nature
of births] and the competing interest of some parents in con-
cealing the circumstances of a birth. We are powerless to dis-
turb this resolution unless the Constitution elevates the right to
avoid disclosure of adoption records above the right to know the
identity of one's parents.9
The court, almost summarily, dismissed the plaintiffs' claims
that the Tennessee statute infringed their right to marry and
to raise children, asserting that the statute had no such ef-
fect. The court similarly rejected the reproductive privacy
claim, doubting whether the statute burdened the adoption
process at all. Finally, the court concluded that any consti-
tutionally protected right to avoid the disclosure of private
information was not sufficiently broad to include the interests
per. 302 (Ch. Div. 1977)) ("'It is highly likely' that the natural parent of an adult
adoptee will choose 'not to reveal to his or her spouse... the facts of an emotionally
upsetting and potentially socially unacceptable occurrence of many years past.'").
91 See ld. at 22; see also Carol Chumney, Tennessee's New Adoption Contact Veto
Is Cold Comfort to Birth Parents, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 843, 872 (1997) ("Both the Sixth
Circuit and the district court opinions noted the Supreme Court's recognition of an
individual interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters.").
See Appellants' Brief, supra note 89, at 17. This claim appears to apply to sib-
lings from the same biological family. It received short shrift in the Sixth Circuit's
opinion, which seemed generally concerned with the rights of biological parents. See
Doe, 106 F.3d at 702.
Appellants' Brief, supra note 89, at 20. Unlike the decision to conceive a child,
however, the decision to adopt a child involves several sets of parties in addition to
the ultimate parents.
9 Doe, 106 F.3d at 705.
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alleged by plaintiffs.' The court reframed the issues to focus
on confidentiality of information, rather than on privacy
within the family. The Tennessee Supreme Court ultimately
reached similar conclusions with respect to the Tennessee
Constitution.9 That court held that the statute did not vio-
late the birth parents' right to privacy because it included
protections for their privacy interests, because it did not in-
fringe on procreative decision malng, and because adoption
is a statutory creation. 7
Doe resembles the earlier decisions in three respects.
First, like the earlier decisions, Doe is somewhat cursory in
describing the particular interests that might be protected.
Second, the rights are framed as conflicting: birth parents
and adoptive parents versus adoptees. 8 Indeed, throughout
the "open records" cases, the interests of adoptees are coun-
terposed against those of the two different sets of parents,
who are, somewhat ironically, deemed to have virtually iden-
tical interests. There is little recognition of the diversity of
positions within each group.99 Third, the court is especially
protective of the State's interest in establishing its own pro-
95 In Alma Society, the court justified the confidentiality of birth records because
"the state does have an interest that does not wane as the adopted child grows to
adulthood, namely the interest in protecting the privacy of the natural parents."
Alma Soc'y Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225. 1236 (2d Cir. 1979).
96 See Doe v. Sundquist, No. 01-S-01-9901-CV-00006. 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 429
(Sept. 27, 1999), rev'g No. 01-A-01-9705-CV-00209. 1998 Tenn. App. L.EXIS 597
(Aug. 24, 1998) (holding that legislation allowing disclosure of adoption information
does not violate the right to privacy or impair the vested rights of birth parents).
97 See id. at *19-22.
The District Court explicitly articulates the issue as "whether a birth parent's
right to prevent an adult adoptee from accessing confidential adoption Information.
including the identity of the birth parent. Is analogous to fundamental privacy and
autonomy rights ... found elsewhere." Doe v. Sundqulst, 943 F. Supp. 886. 893
(M.D. Tenn. 1996). In the Roger B. case, the court similarly framed the adoptees
claims as counter to the rights of the biological and adoptive parents. See In re
Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751. 752-755 (I1. 1981): see also Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of
Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646. 651 (N.J. Super. CL Ch. Div. 1977) ([Tihe right to pri-
vacy asserted by ... [the adoptees] is In direct conflict with the right to privacy of
another party, the natural parent .... The New Jersey statutes which seal adoption
records protect the right to privacy of the adopting parents and that of natural par-
ents from unwarranted intrusion.").
In its focus on groups, rather than on individuals, family law has been a con-
stitutional anomaly. See JANET DOLGIN, REDEFINING THE FAMILY 43 (1997). Dolgin
remarks that:
American law has steadfastly concerned itself with relations between, or the rights
and obligations of, autonomous individuals, and in general cannot or will not seri-
ously address group needs or responsibilities except by focusing on the needs or re-
sponsibilities of the individuals that compose such groups. Family law has been a
remarkable exception in this regard ....
ICL
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cedures concerning adoption," regardless of the form those
procedures take or their apparent conflicts with earlier adop-
tion laws.
The Doe trial court is ultimately correct in noting that "the
disclosure of private information to adult adoptees under the
Act is not sufficiently analogous to fundamental familial and
reproductive privacy rights." 01 The traditional articulation of
the fundamental right to privacy does not comprehend the
various interests at stake in the adoption cases. The cases'
discussions of personhood and privacy provide conflicting
notions of whose rights and interests merit protection at any
one time. The very notion of privacy- the right to be let
alone- has developed as protection for individuals from state
interference. Because adoption is a state-created status In-
volving relationships within and between families, the tradi-
tional formulation of the doctrine is problematic.
III. OPENING RECORDS
As a policy matter, we believe that records should be
opened for adult adoptees. Adult adoptees have a strong in-
terest in having access to information about their biological
origins. This information may be critical to an adoptee's
sense of identity. ' °2 Moreover, the sealed and self-contained
nature of the adoption process has never accorded with the
realities of the experiences of adoption triad members, who
often feel strong emotions about the secrecy of the process.
Finally, although opening records of completed adoptions
may disrupt the expectations of biological and adoptive par-
ents who have relied on continued secrecy, adoption remains
a state-sanctioned process that is subject to legislative
change. While similar policy arguments could support open-
ness in the context of sperm and egg donors, there are some
too To show its respect for federalism, the court even cites United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (noting that to uphold the challenged federal statute
would wrongfully grant a general police power to Congress). See Doe v. Sundqulst,
106 F.3d 702. 707 (6th Cir. 1997).
101 Doe, 943 F. Supp. at 893.
102 Minor adoptees may also need information about their biological origins, espe-
cially as they mature. See Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption:
Implications for Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 997, 1016
n.94 (1995) [hereinafter Appell, Blending Families] (discussing the evolution of
adoptees' questions as they mature); Harold Grotevant, Coming to Terms with Adop-
tion: The Constriction of Identity from Adolescence into Adulthood, 1 ADOPTION Q. 3
(1997). On children's general need for information critical to forming their identity,
see Ross, supra note 1, at 180-82. While we recognize the importance of this infor-
mation, we believe that until maturity, parents, rather than children, should control
access to this information. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 110- 11.
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differences that make these cases much more difficult than
claims to open adoption records.
A. Adoptees' Strong Identity Interests
There is substantial, albeit controversial, evidence that, for
some adult adoptees, access to information about their bio-
logical origins may be central to their construction of iden-
tity- Adoptees often feel a need to understand their "heri-
tage" and to integrate the circumstances surrounding their
birth into their overall sense of self. 4 Research on adoptees'
development of identity also suggests that adoption plays a
role in their concept of self. While there may be little differ-
ence in the integral sense of identity between adopted and
non-adopted children, adoptees believe that their member-
ship in two families plays a significant role in how they think
about themselves.' 5 Further, the relationship between hav-
ing been adopted and one's sense of self changes as the
adoptee develops.10 Consequently, it is important to look at
identity as a dynamic and constructed concept. For adopted
children, identity is particularly complex; as Barbara Wood-
house points out, not only do adopted children have their
"social"/legal families, they also have their families of ori-
gin. 10
The Supreme Court has recognized the strong connection
between identity and liberty, as well as the extent to which
identity formation depends upon the development of close
relationships with others. As the Court explained in Roberts
v. United States Jaycees,1 o the protection that the Constitu-
tion accords to highly personal relationships "reflects the re-
103 See generally BE=h" JEAN LIFTON. JOURNEY OF THE ADOPTED SEIF (1994): THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION (David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter eds.. 1990)
[hereinafter JOURNEY]. Many adoptees have written about the relationship between
their search for self and their search for their biological parents. See. e.g.. GREEN.
supra note 66; BEIY JEAN LIFTON. TWICE BORN: MMElOIRS OF AN ADOPTED DAUGHTER
(1977).
104 See GREEN. supra note 66; Janice DeVore et al.. A Loe that Never DiedL Es-
banged Mother and Daughter Reunited, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING. May 1998. at 118.
available in 1998 WL 9928085; Mary Ann Fergus. The Search- One Man's Search for
His Birth Mother Ends with Help of Intermediary. PANTAGRAPH. Apr. 14. 1998. at D1:
Mardell Groth et al., An Agency Moves Toward Open Adoption of Infants. 66 CHILD
WELFARE. 247, 255 (1987).
105 See Grotevant, supra note 102, at 15.
106 See id. See generally JOURNEY, supra note 103.
107 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse. "Are You My Mother?': Conceptualizing Chil-
dren'sldentity Rights in Transrac Ia Adoptions. 2 DUKEJ. GENDER L. & POL*Y 107. 128
(1995).
108 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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alization that individuals draw much of their emotional en-
richment from close ties with others. Protecting these rela-
tionships from unwarranted state interference therefore safe-
guards the ability independently to define one's identity that
is central to any concept of liberty. " "' °
Focusing on the concept of identity, and particularly on its
fluidity, suggests that the appropriate solution to the adop-
tion records controversy is one that allows for change over
time. At the time a birth parent relinquishes a child for
adoption, it is that parent's identity that is most salient. A
birth parent who decides, often after painful soul-searching,
to construct an identity for herself (and her child) that does
not include an ongoing parent-child relationship should be
permitted to do so." ° Respecting a birth parent's desire for
separation and confidentiality is also consistent with the
broad deference accorded to parental decisionmaking on be-
half of children in other contexts. "' " In addition, respecting
the decision not to maintain a parent-child relationship is
consistent with the protection afforded to other reproductive
choices. Moreover, the wishes of the adoptive family are also
important at this point, particularly because they are con-
cerned with building a stable familial relationship for the
child; if the adoptive parents do not wish to have open rec-
ords at the time of adoption, then their wish should be re-
spected.
As an adopted child matures, however, and the birth par-
ent's relinquishment recedes in time, the child's Identity
should begin to predominate. By the time the child reaches
the age of majority, the child's need to construct her own
identity may include the need to know her birth parents. At
this point, the child's identity interests outweigh the birth
parent's earlier desire to prevent the establishment of a par-
ent-child relationship. Moreover, the child's status as an
adult diminishes any claim a birth parent may have to make
19 Id. at 619.
110 We are not here concerned with conflicts between biological parents as to
whether their child should be adopted; we are assuming that both parents consent
to the adoption.
I See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 (1972) (allowing Amish par-
ents to withhold their children from compulsory education beyond the eighth grade):
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (protecting, in dicta, parents'
rights to educate their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (re-
versing conviction of teacher who had instructed child in foreign language In viola-
tion of Nebraska statute, under rationale that Fourteenth Amendment protects
teacher's liberty). See also Naomi Cahn, Models of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. _ (forthcoming 1999); Carol Sanger, Separatingfrom Children, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 375 (1996) (examining the law on adoption, surrogacy. and maternal employ-
ment).
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decisions on behalf of the child. This analysis suggests that
there should be a strong presumption of open records at the
election of an adult adoptee.
In an amicus brief in the Doe litigation, adoptees explained
why they sought access to their birth records." 2 For some,
there were medical reasons, such as the need to know of a
hereditary form of cancer or a family history of heart dis-
ease."3 Additionally, the brief explained, all of the adoptees
"need to know who gave them their lives, their bodies, their
faces and their hereditary characters." ' 4 Adoptees' desire to
search for their biological relatives develops from many differ-
ent sources and may include both physical and psychological
reasons. 115
Many adoptees will not choose to access their original
birth certificates, and they will, of course, be under no pres-
sure to do so. As one adoptee explains, these "laws are not
about searching or reunion, but about rights... to access
their birth records without hindrance.""' Adoptees can thus
become more active participants in the confidentiality proc-
ess.
B. Rejection of the Sameness Model
The secrecy of the adoption process actually serves to re-
inforce the difference between adoptive and biological families
and the traditional stigma that has been attached to adop-
tion." 7 Policies and practices within the adoption community
for the past half century have attempted to make adoptive
112 See Brief of Amid Curiae in Support of Defendants' Rule II Application. Doe v.
Sundquist, 943 F. Supp. 886 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
13 See il. at 4.
114 Id. at 5.
. See Marshall D. Schechter & Doris Bertoccl. The Meaning of the SearcL in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION. supra note 103. at 62.
16 Shea Grimm Redmond. Letters to the Editor. SEATrLE IMES, Aug. 27. 1998. at
B5.
17 As an example of the negative attitudes towards adoption, consider the results
of the first general adoption survey ever undertaken. In the survey of more than
1500 adults. 90% of the participants had a favorable opinion of adoption, and 95%
generally supported it, acknowledging that adoption serves a useful purpose in soci-
ety. Nonetheless, when it came to an examination of the adoptive family. respon-
dents were somewhat more cautious. Half of the respondents believed that. while
having an adopted child was better than having no child at all. it was not quite as
good as having a biological child. Furthermore. only tvo-thirds of the respondents
believed that it was highly likely that an adoptee would love her adoptive parents as
much as her biological parents. See Cheryl Wetzstein. Qualms Temper Americans'
Favorable View of Adoption; Demographics have B g Effect on People's Views. WASH.
TMES, Nov. 19, 1997, at A2; see also PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES.
BENCHMARK ADOPTION STUDY 1 (1997).
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families "the same as" biological families. In the past, one of
the principal strategies was an attempt to replicate the family
that the adoptive couple and the child would have had, ab-
sent adoption, by making the adoptive parents look as though
they were the "real" parents."8
The philosophy underlying this attempt to create a new
family, unmoored from the adoption process, has never ac-
counted for the reality of the adoption process, and has be-
gun to disintegrate as adoptees, biological parents, and
adoptive parents question this model. Indeed, over the past
decade adoption professionals have increasingly recognized
that adoption is a life-long process, and that adopted children
are forever members of not one, but two families."' All mem-
bers of the adoption triad generally experience complicated
emotions about the process throughout their lives.'12  Early
research suggested that adoptees experienced more psycho-
logical problems than did members of the general population.
While this research has been partially discredited,"2 adoptees
nevertheless often face special, and distinct, psychological is-
sues. For the biological parents, their identity as "parents"
remains, regardless of when they relinquished their child.
Quite commonly, biological parents still feel that they are
parents, and adopted children often search, quite desper-
118 There is an eerie resemblance to the past adoption matching process In the
contemporary process of "choosing" the appropriate egg or sperm donor - one that is
free of blemish. See Jeanne Marie Laskas, Left Unsaid, WASH. POST MAG., Mar. 29,
1998, at W35; Barbara Vobejda, Egg Donation: A Growing Business; Fertility Suc-
cesses Raise Demand, Price, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1999, at Al (citing a newspaper ad-
vertisement that appeared in various newspapers) ("Egg donor needed. . . . You
must be at least 5'10". Have a 1400+ SAT score.").
119 See ARTHUR D. SOROSKY ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 220 (1978) (concluding
that adoption is a life-long process for birth parents, adoptive parents, and the
adoptee); Appell, Blending Families, supra note 102, at 997 (noting the "increasingly
widespread recognition that adoption can best be described as a life-long three-way
link between the adoptee and his or her two families"); Kenneth W. Watson, The Case
for Open Adoption, PUB. WELFARE, Fall 1988, at 24, 24.
120 See Appell, Blending Families, supra note 102, at 998-99 ("In addition to the
positive aspect of providing children with permanent homes, adoption involves a se-
ries of losses .... These multiple losses . . .undermine the mythic foundation of
contemporary adoption as a simple substitution of the adoptive family for the birth
family."): Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption Law, FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1993, at
43, 49-50 ("The notion that adoptive relationships should or can substitute com-
pletely for biological ones is now being questioned .... [A]doptive relationships are
not identical to biological ones except in the sense of formal legal equivalence.").
121 While many studies have found that the rate of psychiatric problems is higher
among adoptees than among non-adoptees, some studies have reached a contrary
conclusion. See Barbara Ingersoll, Psychiatric Disorders Among Adopted Childrew A
Review and Commentary, 1 ADOPTION Q. 57, 59, & 68 n.2 (1997). There are several
possible reasons for the higher rate of psychiatric problems, including a "referral
bias" among adoptive families. Id. at 59.
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ately, to re-form their connection with these "parents."
The stories of birth mothers who have relinquished their
children for adoption, and who remain confident that this
was the right decision for them,22 provide insights into their
feelings as parents. Although these women are often seen as
unnatural- who else but an unnatural woman could give up
her child for adoption?- they typically have powerful and
well-thought-out explanations for why they have relinquished
their children. These explanations often center on the many
different pressures they experienced to give up their child in
the hope of ensuring for that child a better life. '2 Margaret
Moorman explains that "[lit was easy to believe that a child
could have no worse start in life than to be born to a mother
like me. The baby's only hope was to go to someone else as
quickly as possible and be spared any further contamina-
tion." The women were reassured that their lives would
continue as before their pregnancy (even if they had cause to
disbelieve this).'2
Nonetheless, many birth mothers still feel a closeness to
the children that they relinquished for adoption.'" The very
term used to describe them- "birth mothers"- recognizes
their status as parent, albeit not as unmodified mothers.
Years after the adoption, many birth mothers still feel that
they are parents, that they are connected to their children,'2
and that they want to find those children.'2
As some feminists have argued, there is generally (though
1 The stories of women who have relinquished their children, and subsequently
changed their minds, clearly show that their identity as mothers had a profound in-
fluence on them. We are interested, however. in the stories of women who remain
committed to their decision to relinquish a child; by examining their feelings about
their identities as parents, we gain insight into the identities of women who are not
conventionally defined as parents.
123 For case law articulating the position that children fare better in stable nuclear
families than with their unwed mothers, see cases cited in Katharine T. Bartlett. Re-
E ressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293. 316 n.94 (1988).
MARGAREr MOORMAN, VAITING TO FORGEr 66 (1996); see also DeVore et al.. supra
note 104.
125 See, e.g., MOORMAN, supra note 124. at 68 (71 had been told, again and again.
that I would give my baby up and put this all behind me.1. For further discussion of
the treatment and attitudes of biological mothers during the mid-twentleth century.
see SOLINGER, supra note 28.
126 See Twila L. Perry, T-ansracial and International Adoption: Mothers. Hierarchy.
Race and Feminist Legal Theory. 10 YALEJ.L. & FFUhNISM 101 (1998).
127 See the stories in KATHLEEN SILBER & PATRIcIA MARTINEZ DORNER. CHILDREN OF
OPENADOPTION (1989); SOROSKY ErAL.. supra note 119. at 55-67 (1978).
128 See MOORMiAN, supra note 124. at 142; DeVore. supra note 104 ('[Elvery De-
cember 20, my daughter's birthday. I realized that she was very much on my mind. I
found myself praying that the phone would ring and she'd be on the other end of the
line.").
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not always) a bond between the pregnant woman and her de-
veloping fetus.'29 In recognition of this, birth mothers were
often blindfolded in the delivery room, so they would not see
their children.' 30 The affinity and closeness between birth
mother and child is accorded little respect by adoption law.
The birth father has been, if anything, accorded even less
protection."13
For birth parents to maintain contact with their children
following an adoption is extremely difficult. Until recently,
many states prohibited meetings between adoptive parents
and birth parents.' 32  There is often no way to trace an
adopted child, because she receives a new birth certificate
with the names of her adoptive parents, and the adoption re-
cords are sealed. Consequently, it can be extremely difficult
for the birth parent to find an adopted child." Indeed, this is
what happened to Professor Cahn's husband. After begin-
ning his own search, his birth mother, dying of brain cancer,
had written to the adoption agency asking for information
about her son. The agency coldly informed her that it was
unable to provide any information about him.
In recent years, birth mothers have begun to speak out
about their experiences. ' 34 Interviews with birth mothers
show the ambivalence and pain that they feel about giving up
129 See, e.g., BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND
TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY (1989); Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the
Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduction" and the Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 355, 375
(1989) ("Barbara Johnson... finds in the pronomic usages embodied In those texts
evidence not only of the non-binary nature of the pregnancy experience but also the
reality of a recollective identification with the experience of pre-natality, of "fetal"
being."); Vicki C. Jackson, Baby M and the Question of Parenthood, 76 GEO. L.J.
1811, 1820 n.23 ("[Tihat a strong and powerful relationship Is often created during
pregnancy is an undeniable and generally wonderful feature of our reproductive
life."); Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood Feminist Theory and State Regulation of Preg-
nancy, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1325 (1990) (emphasizing the Importance of maternal-fetal
interdependence). As some of the opponents of open records emphasize, the biologi-
cal mother may not feel such a bond, particularly where a child has been conceived
as the result of a rape.
130 See Janet Hopkins Dickson, supra note 16, at 938.
131 Until recently, unless he was married to the birth mother, the father's consent
was unnecessary for an adoption to be finalized.
132 See Barbara Yngvesson, Negotiating Motherhood: Identity and Difference in
"Oen" Adoptions, 31 L. & SOC'Y. REv. 31 (1997).
See generally Patrick McMahon, Adoptees Demand Right to Past, USA TODAY,
June 25, 1999, at 3A: Adam Portman, Oregon Voters Could Open Door to Adoptees'
Past, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 2, 1998, at Al.
13 See Maureen A. Sweeney, Between Sorrow and Happy Endings: A New Para-
digm of Adoption, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 329 (1990); Mary Jo Kochaklan, '90s Fam-
ily: Adoption Gives New Meaning to Families, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 1994, at 3E; cf.
Lucinda Franks, The War for Baby Clausen, NEw YORKER 56 (Mar. 22, 1993) (de-
scribing the goals of Concerned United Birthparents).
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their children for adoption, as well as the hopes that they
have for their children. Many birth mothers still see their
children as "a part of me" with whom they would like to
maintain at least occasional contact 3 ' When anthropologist
Judith Modell interviewed birth parents, she found that
"[b]irth parents... insisted that a birth bond could not be
severed no matter what happened to a birth certificate. " "
Modell found that the birth parents she interviewed were
completely unable to forget the birth of their child, contrary
to the advice they had received from adoption experts. Birth
parents generally do not wish for the return of the child or
desire to regain a direct parental role in the child's life;
rather, birth parents simply want to know whether the child
was placed in an adoptive home, how she is developing, and
whether she is alive.13
While many studies focus on the feelings of biological
mothers, biological fathers may also have a strong interest in
information about their children. In a case requesting the
release of information about American servicemen who had
fathered children overseas, affidavits from numerous fathers
expressed a strong desire in finding their biological children.
These affidavits rebutted the government's claims that the
release of identifying information could be "both highly em-
barrassing and personally disturbing to [the servicemen]."' a
Based on these affidavits, the court rejected the government's
contention that the release of identifying information "would
invite an unwanted intrusion."'3
For adoptive parents, there have always been a set of spe-
cial issues that implicate secrecy. How do they explain the
adoption to their child, their families, their community?
What should they say when a stranger asks a blond-haired,
blue-eyed mother about her brown-haired and brown-eyed
son? While adoptive parents today generally support allowing
adoptees access to identifying information, they are not with-
out ambivalence and apprehension.' 4 Nevertheless, a recent
135 Yngvesson, supra note 132, at 56.
1 JUDITH MODELL, KINSHIP WIri STRANGERS: ADOPTION AND INTERPRETATIONS OF
KINSHIP IN AMERICAN CULTURE 90 (1994).
137 See &L at 1018.
8 War Babes v. Wilson, 770 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990).
139 Id. at 4. For a summary of the affidavits, see Mem. Supp. Pl.*s Partial Summ. J.
at 11-13, War Babes (No. 88-3633). This case was litigated by our colleague. Profes-
sor Joan Meier.
140 See Paul Sachdev, The Triangle of Fears: FaUacles and Facts. 68 CHILD WELFARE
491 (1989) (relating study of Canadian adoptions in which most adoptive parents
supported the release of information, but, not surprisingly, were somewhat uncom-
fortable when asked to think about disclosure to their own children).
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survey of more than 1200 adoptive parents found that 84% of
the adoptive mothers and 73% of the adoptive fathers agreed
that an adult adoptee should be entitled to disclosure of her
original birth certificate. 
141
Members of the adoption triangle have always struggled
with reconciling the (non)existence of their families. Allowing
adoptees access to their birth records serves as an acknowl-
edgment of the distinct challenges that they experience as
they develop their identity, and helps biological parents rec-
oncile themselves to the relinquishment decision. Ironically,
without needing to keep secrets, adoptive families may indeed
become more like non-adoptive families.
C. Consistency With Other Family Law Developments
The opening of adoption records is also consistent with de-
velopments in other areas of family law that have questioned
the model of the unitary family and have encouraged and
protected the involvement of multiple caretakers in a child's
life. 42  For example, in the divorce context, many legal and
mental health professionals have endorsed the concept of
post-divorce co-parenting and have emphasized the impor-
tance to children of maintaining close and continuing contact
with both parents.'" Similarly, the law has increasingly fa-
141 See Rosemary J. Avery, Information Disclosure and Openness in Adoption: State
Policy and Empirical Evidence, 20 CHILDREN &YOUTH SERVS. REV. 57, 73 (1998). The
respondents were divided as to whether an adoptee was an "adult" at age 18 or 21.
See id.
142 See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive
Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family has
Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984) [hereinafter Rethinking Parenthood]; Gilbert A.
Holmes, The Tie that Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain Relation-
ships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 393 (1994).
3 See, e.g., ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DMDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 277 (1992); Peter Salem, Education For Di-
vorcing Parents: A New Direction for Family Courts, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 837 (1995)
("[P]rograms are designed to provide parents with information about children's
needs, divorce adjustment, and post-divorce parenting. In addition... parent edu-
cation programs may serve to mitigate the acrimony between parents so often asso-
ciated with divorce."); Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Coop-
erative Custody After Divorce, 64 'TX. L. REv. 687, 691 (1985) (advocating the view
that "the role of the state must change to encourage a shift from combative to coop-
erative postdivorce parenting"); W. Glenn Clingempeel & N. Dickon Reppucci, Joint
Custody After Divorce: Major Issues and Goals for Research, in READINGS IN FAMILY
LAw 163 (Frederica K. Lombard ed., 1990) ("In the majority of cases, frequent Inter-
action with the noncustodial parent has been found to have a positive effect on chil-
dren's adjustment to divorce."). One recent study of divorcing families in Wisconsin
reports that joint legal custody now accounts for more than 80% of all post-divorce
custody arrangements. See Marygold S. Melli et al., Child Custody in a Changing
World: A Study of Postdivorce Arrangements in Wisconsin, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 773.
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cilitated the involvement of unmarried fathers in their chil-
dren's lives, regardless of whether those fathers have previ-
ously established a relationship with the child's mother.
Legal protection for "multiple parenthood" also extends be-
yond biological parents. Grandparent visitation statutes in
all fifty states now allow grandparents to seek court-ordered
visitation with their grandchildren, even over parental objec-
tion.' 44 While early grandparent visitation statutes were gen-
erally limited to families affected by parental death or divorce,
more recent amendments apply as well to so-called "intact"
two-parent families.14 Moreover, many states have expanded
their grandparent visitation statutes to include other mem-
bers of the child's family, such as aunts, uncles, and siblings.
The law has also increasingly recognized the relationship
between step-parents and children, even after dissolution of
the marriage between the step-parent and the biological par-
ent.146
Similar changes have occurred within adoption law. Most
private infant adoptions are now "open" from the outset,
meaning that the biological and adoptive parents "choose"
each other, often after a face-to-face meeting. In many cases,
biological and adoptive parents also agree to ongoing post-
adoption contact, which can range from an annual exchange
of photographs to regular visitation or telephone communica-
tion.47 In a study of the changes in adoption agency prac-
tices, researchers found a significant increase in the number
144 See generally Anne Marie Jackson. Comment Thw Coming of Age of Grandpar-
ent Visitation Rights, 43 Arl. U. L. REV. 563 (1994) (noting that most state statutes
allow courts to grant visitation rights to grandparents if It is in the best interest of
the child).
145 See Sarah Norton Harpring, Wide-Open Grandparent Visitation Statutes: Is the
Door Closing?, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 1659 (1994). Some commentators have criticized
the trend toward "wide open" grandparent visitation statutes. See. e.g.. Joan C.
Bohl, The "Unprecedented Intrusion": A Survey and Analysts of Selected Grandparent
VLsitation Cases, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 29 (1996). The Supreme Court recently agreed to
hear a constitutional challenge to a grandparent visitation statute. See Troxel v.
Granville, 120 S. CL 11 (1999). In TroxeL the parents of a deceased biological father
sought visitation with their grandchildren, who had been adopted by the mother's
new husband.
4 See, e.g. CAL. FA/l. CODE § 3101(a) (West 1994) (authorizing court to grant rea-
sonable visitation to step-parent if such visitation is In the child's best interest): N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17(VI) (1992 & Supp. 1995) (authorizing custody awards to
step-parents). See generally Bryce Levine. Note. Divorce and the Modem Family:
Providing In Loco Parentis Stepparents Standing to Sue for Custody of Their Stepchil-
dren in a Dissolution Proceeding, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 315 (1996): Jennifer Klein
Mangnall, Comment, Stepparent Custody Rights After Divorce. 26 Sw. U. L. REV. 399
(1997).
147 See Carol A. Gorenberg, Fathers' Rights vs. Chlldren's Best Interests: Estab-
lishing a Predictable Standard for California Adoption Disputes. 31 FAM. L.Q. 169.
207-08 (1997) (discussing various types of open adoption arrangements).
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of agencies offering adoptions with contact. '48 The primary
reason for the increase was a response to client demand.'49
Moreover, a number of states have recently enacted legis-
lation designed to validate and enforce open adoption agree-
ments when both the biological and adoptive parents have
consented to the contact.' Other states have passed stat-
utes authorizing a court to award post-adoption visitation
rights to a child's biological relatives whenever such visitation
is in the child's best interest.' 5' Open adoption is also being
touted as an option in the foster care context, in part to en-
courage biological parents, who are unable to care for a child,
to voluntarily relinquish their parental rights without com-
pletely severing their connection to the child. 52  Even the
Uniform Adoption Act, which is generally hostile to open
adoption, recognizes the desirability of post-adoption visita-
tion in the context of step-parent families."n
Modem psychological theory also supports the recognition
and protection of children's relationships with multiple care-
takers. Psychologists now believe that children can form and
maintain attachments to multiple adult caretakers and that
neither parental authority nor caretaking need be exclusive to
be effective."
'48 See Susan M. Henney et al., Changing Agency Practices Toward Openness in
Adoption, 1 ADOPTION Q. 45, 53 (1998) (finding that 65% of the 35 agencies studies
did not offer a completely open option from 1987-89, while only 23% did not offer
such service in 1993). The researchers Identified three different types of openness
options: (1) "confidential adoptions," where there is no contact between biological
and adoptive parents; (2) "mediated adoptions," where the agency facilitates contact
between the two sets of parents; and (3) "fully disclosed" adoptions, where the par-
ents contacted each other directly. Id. at 52. It was in this last category that agen-
cies experienced such dramatic change.
149 See id. at 56-57.
150 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-35 (Michle 1998 & Supp. 1999); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 109.305 (1990 & Supp. 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.295 (West
1997). For a comprehensive discussion of such legislation, see Annette R. Appell,
Increasing Options to Improve Permanency: Considerations in Drafting an Adoption
with Contact Statute, 18 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 24, 36-42 (1998).
151 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-16-1 to 16.5-7 (West 1999): NEB. REV. STAT. §
43-162 (1998); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 383-c (McKinney 1992).
The Uniform Adoption Act allows for the creation and enforcement of adoption-
with-contact orders in step-parent adoptions, even where the parties have not agreed
to permit the contact. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 4-112 to 113, 9 U.L.A. 75-77 (1999);
Margaret M. Mahoney, Open Adoption in Context: The Wisdom and Enforceability of
Visitation Orders for Former Parents under Uniform Adoption Act § 4-113. 51 FLA. L.
REV. 89 (1999).
152 See, e.g., Appell, Blending Families, supra note 102, at 1013-1021.
153 See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 4-103, 9 U.L.A. 69-70 (1999).
154 See Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good Mother: A New Look at Psychological Parent
Theory, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 347, 356 (1996) (analyzing research that
indicates that children can be securely attached not only to their mothers, but also
to their fathers and other care givers); Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental
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Ironically, despite the many changes in the structure of
the traditional family, there has been resistance to open rec-
ords. The growing acceptance of adoption-with-contact pres-
ents a significant challenge both to adoption practices and to
notions of who counts as family, yet there remains significant
opposition to the unsealing of birth records. To some extent,
this may be a transition problem; as adoptions more fre-
quently involve contact between biological and adoptive par-
ents, an adoptee may no longer need an original birth certifi-
cate to identify her biological parents. Assuming that not all
adoptions are "open," however, access to adoption records
remains a significant issue.
D. Relational View
Open birth records allow for a more "relational" view of the
adoption process. Under the traditional view, parenthood is a
unitary bundle of rights: it is (1) exclusive, meaning that
there can be only one set of parents; (2) a zero sum game, in
that legal recognition of an adoptive family precluded any
further relationship between the child and her biological par-
ents; and (3) a status that can be renounced or transferred.'"
In adoption, this traditional view has meant only one set of
parents for each child because it was believed that recogniz-
ing anyone else as having anything akin to a parental rela-
tionship deprived the adoptive parents of their exclusive legal
status and disrupted traditional conceptions of the family.
By contrast, under a relational view, parenthood is not
Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423. 460-74 (1983) (discussing a number of studies that
support the notion that contact between the child and his natural parents is prefer-
able to absolute termination of parental rights); Eleanor Willemson & Kristen Marcel.
Attachment 101 for Attorneys: Implicatlons for Infant Placement Decisions. 36 SrAv,
CLARA L. REV. 439 (1996); Candace M. Zierdt. Make New Parents But Keep the Old.
69 N.D. L. REv. 497, 507 (1993) (maintaining that it is possible for children to have
strong psychological bonds with more than one adult).
155 See Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood. supra note 123, at 297-98; Bartlett. Re-
thinking Parenthood, supra note 142, at 879; Naomi R. Cahn. Refraining Child Cus-
tody Decisionmaking, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 6-9 (1997): David Meyer. Family Ties:
Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless Father. 41 ARIZ. L REV 753 (1999).
156 Adoption also complicates the notion that parenthood is biologically based. In a
society that clings to the notion that blood Is thicker than water. camouflaging
adoption serves to replicate biologically formed families rather than challenging the
relationship between reproduction and parenthood. For further discussion. see
Linda Lacey, "0 Wind. Remind Him That I Have No Child': Infertility and Feminist Ju-
risprudence, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 163 (1998); Perry. supra note 126; Naomi R.
Cahn, Family Issue(s), 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 325 (1994) (book review). See generally
ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTiON AND THE POLITICS OF PARENITENG
(1993); HELENA MICHIE & NAOMI R. CAHN. CONFINEMENTS: FERTILTY AND INFERnLTY I
CONTEMPORARY CULTURE (1997).
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necessarily a zero-sum game, and recognizing a biological
parent's ongoing connection with an adoptive child does not
diminish the adoptive parents' legal rights, nor does It inevi-
tably threaten the integrity of the adoptive family. Under the
relational view, parenthood is viewed as a relationship rather
than a status. 11 Parenthood, therefore, cannot be termi-
nated, even if it becomes either temporarily or permanently
attenuated. This relational view allows for many more varia-
tions or nuances within adoption. Thus, for example, adop-
tion with contact represents a recognition of multiple rela-
tionships, rather than a threat to the adoptive parents' legal
status. Further, unsealing birth records recognizes that
adopted children may seek connection with their biological
relatives.
E. Objections to Opening Records
A policy of unsealing birth records is not uncontroversial,
however. As applied to adoptions that have already occurred
pursuant to a sealed records regime, there may be retroactiv-
ity problems. Moreover, allowing access could be viewed as
promoting "genetic essentialism," that is, the view that people
are merely the sum of their genes. Additionally, some have
argued that unsealing records may undermine adoption by
discouraging prospective adoptive parents. Finally, although
this article focuses on adoption, some of the same reasoning
may be applicable to gamete donors; this application of an
openness policy deserves further consideration.
1. Retroactivity
The unsealing of adoption records is most controversial
with respect to adoptions that took place under a sealed rec-
ords regime. Opponents of open records have argued that
unsealing the records of these adoptions unfairly breaches
promises of confidentiality made to biological and adoptive
parents at the time the adoptions took place. As the Tennes-
see Court of Appeals explained, "'Life-changing decisions were
made based on this expectation ... ." Although initially
appealing, such breach of promise arguments are ultimately
unpersuasive. First, the evidence suggests that few birth
1S7 See Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood. supra note 123, at 295, 337 (critiquing
notion of parenthood as a status).
15 Doe v. Sundquist, No. 01-A-01-9705-CV-00209, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 597, at
*25 (Aug. 24, 1998) rev'd No. 01-S-01-9901-CV-00006, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 429 (Sept.
27, 1999).
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mothers were offered a choice about confidentiality. Rather,
"many birth parents report that they were not promised con-
fidentiality but instead were informed by agencies that their
anonymity would be a condition of the adoption."'o Nor could
adoption agencies lawfully have promised birth parents or
adoptive families absolute confidentiality, since adoption rec-
ords can be opened upon a judicial finding of good cause un-
der virtually all sealed records regimes.'o Thus, the effect of
an open records statute on adoptions completed under a
sealed records regime may simply be to shift the locus of de-
cision-making from the judicial system to the adult adoptee.
Some birth parents also argue that opening previously
sealed adoption records impermissibly interferes with their
vested legal rights.16 ' Although the intermediate court ac-
cepted this argument in Doe v. Sundquist, the Tennessee Su-
preme Court did not. That court noted that adoptees have
always been able to gain access to information through court,
and that the state had been gradually allowing adoptees ac-
cess to additional information. Thus, "[here simply has
never been an absolute guarantee or even a reasonable ex-
pectation . . . that adoption records were permanently
sealed."' 62 Moreover, courts have uniformly rejected such
vested rights arguments in other areas of family law relating
both to personal rights and to property rights. For example,
courts have held that the application of no-fault divorce laws
to marriages entered into under a prior fault-based regime
did not violate the vested rights of "innocent" spouses who
wished to preserve a marriage.'63 Similarly, courts have ruled
that equitable distribution statutes, widely adopted in the
1970s to give each divorcing spouse an ownership interest in
property previously owned by one spouse alone, could con-
stitutionally be applied to property acquired and marriages
entered into before the ownership rules were changed." In
both contexts, courts have firmly rejected the assertion that
family members have a legally protected interest in having
their rights and obligations remain static. These cases indi-
159 Madelyn Freundlich, Adoptees have Rights. N.Y. TImES. Feb. 5. 1999. at A26
(letter to the editor).
160 See CARP, supranote 14, at 43-44.
161 See, e.g., Doe, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 597. at *25 (holding that 'retroactive'
application of Tennessee open records law impermissibly impairs vested rights of
biological parents in violation of Tennessee Constitution).
16 Doe, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 429. at 16.
16 See, e.g., Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1973): Gleason v. Gleason. 256
N.E.2d 513 (N.Y. 1969).
,64 See, e.g., McCree v. McCree. 464 A.2d 922 (D.C. 1983): Rothman v. Rothman.
320 A.2d 496 (N.J. 1974).
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cate that popularly elected legislatures retain the authority to
alter the contours of state-created family law structures, and
that neither promises nor expectations about the continuing
consequences of those structures rises to the level of a vested
constitutional right.
2. Genetic Essentialism
Unsealing birth records allows adoptees to find their bio-
logical relatives. Such a focus raises the danger of over-
emphasizing one's genetic identity. As Professors Rochelle
Dreyfuss and Dorothy Nelkin point out, "'How to' books and
articles written for adoptees stress the importance of finding
one's natural or birth parents and suggest that knowing one's
genetic heritage is a way to define identity."" These books
and articles are part of a trend, which Dreyfuss and Nelkin
define as "genetic essentialism," the concept that a person is
the sum of her genes and that behavior can be predicted
based on genetic information. 66 Critics have accused open
records advocates of endorsing such essentialism and of as-
serting that blood kinship is superior to adoptive relation-
ships 67 While we advocate disclosing the identity of biologi-
cal parents, we do not justify such disclosure based on the
genetic information that disclosure will provide. " Instead,
we believe that having the same genetic heritage creates the
opportunity for a connection and knowledge that the State
should not foreclose. Further, we do not believe that acquir-
ing this genetic information will allow an adoptee to predict or
explain all of her personal characteristics and traits.
Ironically, adoption law increasingly mandates extensive
disclosure of non-identifying genetic information, while rest-
ing the calls for disclosure of identifying information. This
practice of fully disclosing anonymous genetic information,
with corresponding secrecy of the identity of the person,
seems itself to be an example of genetic essentialism. A pri-
mary rationale for requiring disclosure of non-identifying ge-
netic information is to enable prospective adoptive parents to
165 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45
VAND. L. REv. 313, 319-20 (1992).
166 Id. at 320-2 1.
167 See CARP, supra note 14, at 229 ("[O]ne of the central tenets of the lAdoption
Rights Movement's] ideology rests on the superiority of blood ties and the denigration
of adoptive kinship.").
168 See also Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Adoption, Reproductive Technologies,
and Genetic Information, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 125, 150-51 (1998) (opposing the release
of the identity of biological parents for the sole purpose of allowing adoptees to ob-
tain current genetic information).
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guard against any dangers that might be posed through
"faulty" genes. By contrast, the purpose of disclosing the
identity of biological relatives is to aid adoptees and parents
in their personal and emotional development, though provid-
ing genetic information may be a by-product Knowing the
identity of her biological parents may help the adoptee in her
identity development, but it is certainly not the only factor in
that development.
3. Discouraging Prospective Adoptive Parents
The objections raised by adoptive parents are even less
persuasive in view of the fact that open records do not appear
to affect the ability of parents to adopt. Indeed, the experi-
ences of both Kansas and Alaska, which have long had open
records regimes, indicate that open records may even en-
courage adoption. Rates of adoption in these two jurisdic-
tions are considerably higher than the national average.
Nor does the available evidence suggest that open records re-
gimes compromise the integrity of the adoption process. In-
deed, as Professor Joan Hollinger observes, more than 80% of
the biological mothers who have relinquished children for
adoption in Michigan since 1980 have consented to the dis-
closure of their identity when their children become adults. 7 °
Similarly, research on open adoption suggests that most
adoptive parents who participate in open adoptions view their
experiences positively, even if they were initially hesitant
about openness.' Moreover, whatever constitutionally pro-
tected interests adoptive parents may have in controlling a
child's access to information while the child is a minor weak-
ens considerably once a child reaches majority.
169 In 1992, the national rate of adoptions per 1000 live births was 31.2: in Alaska.
it was 53.5, and in Kansas, it was 48.4. Their aborUon rates were also significantly
lower than the national average: the national rate was 25.8, while It was 19.4 in
Alaska and 12.7 in Kansas. See J. Cameron Tew, A Family Found: Raleigh Resident
Susan MiUer used an Internet search to find her long.lost Biological Family. HERALD-
SuN, June 22, 1997, at El.
170 See HoUinger, supra note 13. at 13-38. She also reports, based on her own In-
formal survey, that the "overwhelming majority' of biological mothers agree. at the
time of their child's adoptive placement, to the disclosure of their IdenUty when the
child becomes an adult Id. at 13-39.
171 See, e.g., Marianne Berry, Risks and Benefits of Open Adoption. 3 FUTURE OF
CHILDREN 125, 130-31 (1993); Harriet E. Gross. Open Adoption: A Research-Based
Literature Review and New Data, 72 CHILD WELFARE 269. 273-75 (1993): Deborah
Siegel, Open Adoption of Infants: Adoptive Parents' Perception of Advantages and
Disadvantages, 38 SOCIALWORK 15, 18 (1993).
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4. The Slippery Slope Argument
Allowing children to find the identity of their biological
parents could apply in contexts outside of adoption. For at
least one hundred years, women have become pregnant
through insemination of "donor""7 ' sperm. The donors are
often promised anonymity by the sperm bank or under state
statute; 73 but, of course, so were many biological parents of
adoptees. Using new reproductive technologies, women can
donate eggs, enabling otherwise infertile women to become
pregnant. In 1996, there were more than 5,000 cases of egg
donation.'74 Should a child ever be able to discover the Iden-
tity of her gamete donor?'7 5
Frankly, we find the issue of secrecy and gamete donation
highly problematic. There are both similarities to and differ-
ences from issues surrounding secrecy in the context of
adoption. For the child, the interests in finding out about
gamete donors may be similar to those of adoptees. The child
seeks to learn of her biological origins. On the other hand,
issues of "relinquishment" or "abandonment" may be far less
complex; "giving up" sperm or an egg may be far more com-
prehensible to a child than is "giving up" a baby. Thus, "do-
nor" children may have fewer psychological issues sur-
rounding their origins, and knowing the identity of their
genetic parents may be less central to their sense of self.
Even these children, however, sometimes express strong in-
terest in meeting their biological relatives.7 This interest has
even been used in popular culture. In the movie "Made in
America," Whoopi Goldberg's daughter searches for her
sperm donor "dad." The daughter tracks down her father and
develops a relationship with him, notwithstanding the fact
that she is a highly intelligent, extremely race-conscious
young African-American woman, and the white father, played
by Ted Danson, is a loud used-car salesman.
172 The use of "donor" in the gamete area is problematic. Men who produce sperm
are paid for their efforts and egg donors are generally paid at least several thousand
dollars. See Kathryn D. Katz, Ghost Mothers: Human Egg Donation and the Legacy
of the Past, 57 ALB. L. REV. 733, 739 (1994); Vobejda. supra note 118, atA7.
73 For example, the Uniform Parentage Act provides that all documents relating to
an insemination are "subject to inspection only upon an order of the court for good
cause shown." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a), 9b U.L.A. 301 (1987).
174 See VobeJda, supra note 118, at A7 (citing Centers for Disease Control num-
bers).
175 See Laskas, supra note 118 (reporting on friend who had agreed never to tell
anrone about an egg donation).
See Laskas, supra note 118 (discussing adult children of mothers who became
pregnant with donated sperm): Vobejda, supra note 118, at A7 (citing potential
problems related to secrecy and gamete donation).
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For gamete donors, the issues are similarly complex. Like
birth parents after adoption, gamete donors lack a legal rela-
tionship with their "children."' w However, unlike a gamete
donor, a birth mother who relinquishes a child for adoption
has carried and nurtured that child for nine months of preg-
nancy. The issues may also be different for male and female
donors; like many biological fathers, sperm donors seem far
less troubled by anonymity than some egg donors, who have
undergone more invasive procedures and may have created a
bond with the recipient family. 'm Additionally, male donors
are capable of "fathering" many more children than are fe-
male donors.
From the perspective of the intending parents, there may
be more secrecy surrounding gamete donation than adoption;
while many parents disclose that their children are adopted,
parents are much less likely to disclose that their children
were conceived through gamete donation. Moreover, unlike
the typical adoption situation, at least one intending parent
typically has a genetic connection to the child.79 At least with
respect to children conceived through artificial insemination
by donor, there is no need for formal adoption by the in-
tended father, as long as the parents have complied with ap-
plicable state procedures.'0
Finally, issues of state involvement differ in the two con-
texts. Only nine states currently protect the anonymity of
gamete donors, while most states still protect the secrecy of
biological parents.' 8 Adoption is also a state-created legal
status, while gamete donation remains a largely private
transaction that is handled through contract and intention.'62
The anonymity of gamete donors is more likely to be pro-
tected through private contracts; state-imposed disclosure
requirements that impair these contracts may raise addi-
177 For a discussion of the curious and ambivalent legal relationships between
adoptees and their biological parents, see Naomi Cahn. Thicker than What? (1999)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Con-
stitutional Law).
178 See Vobejda, supra note 118, at A7 (discussing the bond formed between egg
donees and recipient families).
179 See Lori B. Andrews. Alternative Reproduction and the Law of Adoption. in 2
ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 13, at § 14.01, 14-1.IS See UNIFORM STATUS OF CHILDREN OFASSISTED CONCEPTON ACT, Commentary to §
4. 9b U.L.A. 155 (Supp. 1994).
181 See Allan, supra note 34, at 719 (noting that every state protects the confidenti-
ait of adoption records and citing statutes).
See Katz, supra note 77. at 774. Professor Katz proposes that children of gam-
ete donors receive identifying information: she argues that -gamete donors [who] are
unwilling to have their sons and daughters meet them face to face one day ...
should not participate in the creation of children." Id. at 780.
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tional legal issues.
IV.ADOPTION, IDENTITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION
The state is necessarily involved in adoption because
adoption is a state-created process and status." The state
determines who is eligible to adopt, and who is eligible to be
adopted. The state also controls the consequences of adop-
tion, including the availability of any records. Thus, the
question is not whether the state should regulate adoptions
records, but how.
As discussed above, the Constitution does not preclude
states from opening adoption records. 84 Does it, however, re-
quire states to take this step? As the Alma Society case Illus-
trates, it is difficult to construct a persuasive argument using
conventional due process doctrine, which focuses on con-
cepts of individual privacy and liberty. Framed in terms of
privacy/due process, the privacy interests of the birth and
adoptive parents appear to counterbalance (or cancel out) the
privacy interests of the adult adoptee. Hence, this analysis
suggests that there is no due process right to open records.
Moreover, when intra-familial disputes are constitutionalized,
they inevitably place the rights of various members of a fam-
ily in conflict with one another.1 s This, in turn, threatens the
connections that characterize relationships within the family.
However, as the opening section of this article suggests,
these difficulties may say more about the inadequacy of cur-
rent constitutional doctrine than about the merits of the con-
stitutional claims in favor of open records. A reconstituted
understanding of due process, which focuses not on negative
liberty, but on the development of identity and personhood
that zones of liberty and privacy make possible, might well
support a more robust set of constitutional arguments.
This reconstituted vision would recognize that identity is a
central aspect of personhood, but that the construction of
identity is necessarily relational and dynamic. Identity Is not
constructed autonomously or in isolation from other people,
particularly family members. For adoptees, constructing an
183 See generally Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835 (1985) (arguing that rhetoric of state non-involvement in
the family is more harmful than helpful); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and
Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1135 (discussing the historical involvement of gov-
ernment in the family).
184 See supra text accompanying notes 88-10 1.
185 This is not to deny the importance of rights for family members. See generally
SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989) (arguing for the appli-
cation of notions of justice to the family).
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adult identity may involve processing information about more
than one family and may even entail establishing a relation-
ship with biological, as well as adoptive parents. The con-
struction of identity is one of the important things that pri-
vacy makes possible. In this sense, an important function of
protecting "privacy" is to give individuals the space to con-
struct their identities, in part through their relationships with
others. Thus, privacy is not just decisional autonomy. Chil-
dren, in particular, form identities, even though they do not
make decisions autonomously.
What seems most objectionable about sealed birth records
is not that the State is interfering with the decisional auton-
omy of adoptees but that, by controlling access to this infor-
mation, the State is playing far too large a role in construct-
ing an identity for them." Consequently, in Alma Society,
the court was wrong in not looking beyond competing privacy
interests to a more careful analysis of whether the interests
really did conflict and/or whether the state had any affirma-
tive obligation to find that out. A robust understanding of the
liberty protected by the due process clause may require that a
state not structure its adoption process to preclude access to
this information.
Focusing on the identity-formation function of privacy also
affects the constitutional analysis by suggesting that the par-
ties' interests are not mutually exclusive and that they evolve
over time. In particular, once an adoptee reaches young
adulthood, openness may be much more central to her iden-
tity than continued secrecy is to the identities of the birth (or
adoptive) parents. Thus, to the extent that the State relies on
protecting the identity of birth parents, it at least has the ob-
ligation to make sure that the parent still wants to keep her
identity secret from her adult child.
What the Constitution may require, then, is either an open
records regime or an active, state-facilitated search process
that ensures that records remain closed only where a birth
parent (still) insists on secrecy. Thus, a state could maintain
a closed records system if, and only if, it put in place a confi-
dential intermediary system with an openness default. Such
a confidential intermediary regime would differ from current,
mutual consent registries in that it would be active, rather
than passive. It would differ from current "search and con-
sent" statutes in that openness, rather than continued se-
1 Professor Jeb Rubenfeld has made a related point about privacy and the repro-
ductive freedom cases, arguing that privacy in that contex-t consists of a right to self-
determination. See Rubenfeld. supra note 36. at 752-54.
Dec. 19991
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
crecy, would be the default position. Under such a system, a
request by an adult adoptee would trigger a confidential
search; records would be opened unless a parent were found
and said no. 87 As a constitutional matter, a system that
would allow a birth parent to remain anonymous on a cur-
rent, case-by-case basis is far less troubling than the tradi-
tional sealed records system, which precludes adoptees from
even asking if a birth parent is willing to be contacted (and
vice versa).
This analysis makes sense from a constitutional perspec-
tive because it means that adoptees could be denied access to
their records only when their birth parent actually and cur-
rently chooses to preclude a parent/child relationship. In
this situation, it is no longer the State that is centrally con-
trolling the construction of the adoptees' identity. Of course,
a State can (and we think, should) take a further step and
open records upon the request of an adult adoptee. But, as a
constitutional matter, perhaps the most sympathetic reading
of Alma Society from an "identity" perspective is that, where
there really is a conflict between parents' and children's
identity interests, the state is not required to take sides.
What the State is required to do, however- even if that takes
an affirmative act- is to make sure that a conflict exists be-
fore it denies an adult adoptee access to this information.
Because such an affirmative understanding of liberty
would require a new vision of the Constitution- a highly un-
likely proposition at this point in our legal history-we
ground our belief that states should open adoption records
primarily in public policy considerations. The solution that
we propose recognizes both the strong identity interests of
adult adoptees and the concerns of birth parents (particularly
mothers) who relinquished children for adoption under social
and familial circumstances significantly different from those
that prevail today. Our proposed solution thus distinguishes
between prospective and completed adoptions. For prospec-
tive adoptions, we believe that records should be open at the
election of an adult adoptee. While we would allow a birth
parent, at the time of relinquishment, to note her (or his) ob-
jection to future contact, that objection would not preclude
the disclosure of information to the adult adoptee" When
187 Existing evidence suggests that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, parents
who are found would consent to the release of Identifying information. See Hollinger,
supra note 13, at 13-38.
We leave for another article the complex Issues regarding the biological father's
involvement in the adoption process, as well as the difficult questions posed by dis-
agreements between the biological parents regarding confidentiality.
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an adult adoptee seeks her original birth certificate, and there
is a contact objection in the file, the identifying information
would be released, together with the provisions of the contact
veto. As under the Tennessee statute, an adoptee's violation
of the contact veto could lead to civil tort liability. '6
We would establish a different procedure for past adop-
tions. A request by an adult adoptee to open records of a
past adoption would obligate the State to conduct a confi-
dential search for the birth parent to ascertain whether she
objects to the release of identifying information. If no birth
parent could be found, then the request to open records
would be granted. A birth parent who was found and who
did object would have the right to request a confidential
hearing before any such information would be released. 40 At
that hearing, the burden would be on the birth parent to
show good cause as to why she (or he) should not be identi-
fied.' 91 In the context of completed adoptions, we are uneasy
about automatic disclosure over the current objection of a
birth parent, particularly because some birth mothers may
have strong reasons for maintaining secrecy. In the case of
rape or incest, for example, a woman's safety and psychologi-
cal health may depend on preserving her anonymity, as well
as on avoiding contact. In these cases, a court is likely to
find that the potential harm to the biological parent from dis-
closure is likely to exceed the benefits of openness to the
adult adoptee. We recognize that even this solution may re-
quire some birth mothers to confront a painful or stigmatizing
past that they believed they had put behind them. We be-
lieve, however, that allowing such complete erasure, in the
face of an adoptee's request for disclosure, generally serves to
perpetuate the stigma involved in relinquishing a child for
adoption.,' Moreover, the adult child's search for identity
189 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-132 (1996) (imposing civil liability for violation of
the contact veto). A state could make violation of the contact veto grounds for civil
and/or criminal liability, but only if it also provided a mechanism for determining
whether the birth parent continued to object to contact at the time an adult adoptee
seeks disclosure.
190 A birth parent could also fie an objection on his or her own, assuming that the
parent knew the state in which the adoption took place.
191 One article proposes requiring both biological parents to show good cause as to
why identifying information should not be released, or adoptees to show good cause
as to why the information should be released, then letting a court decide. See Audra
Behn6, Balancing the Adoption Trangle: The State, the Adoptive Parents and the Birth
Parents- Where Does the Adoptee Fit In?, 15 BUFF. J. PUB. INT. L 49. 81-82 (1996-
97).
1 In the first survey of attitudes towards adoption. 90% of the 1500 participants
had a positive opinion of adoption, and 95% generally supported it. Nonetheless.
when it came to an examination of the adoptive family, respondents were somewhat
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and connection become an extremely significant considera-
tion at this point. Thus, even for completed adoptions, our
proposal would shift the traditional presumption from con-
tinued secrecy to openness. For prospective adoptions,
openness would become the norm; while a birth parent could
indicate her opposition to contact, she could not prevent the
disclosure of identifying information. This shift would help
dissolve the aura of secrecy that surrounds adoption in con-
temporary culture and would recognize and mediate between
the different interests inherent in the adoption process.
more cautious. Half of the respondents believed that, while having an adopted child
was better than infertility, it was not quite as good as having a biological child. See
Wetzstein. supra note 1 17. Only two-thirds believed that it was highly likely that an
adoptee would love her adoptive parents as much as her biological parents. See Id.
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